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**FINDING LAWRENCE: RECRUITING TALENT FOR
UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE**

by

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June 2011

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**FINDING LAWRENCE: RECRUITING
TALENT FOR UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE**

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ABSTRACT

From Francis Marion's guerrilla war against the British to advising the resistance against the Nazis and Japanese, the United States has depended on unconventional warfare (UW) as a component of national defense. Today, the U.S. Army Special Forces (SF) is the premiere unconventional warfare unit in the U.S. military. With a smaller Army and increasing missions, SF must expand its recruiting efforts. This thesis analyzes the recruitment and selection process used by other units and finds four traits common to successful UW individuals: motivation, interpersonal intelligence, cross-cultural capability, and adaptability. SF recruiting is then examined to identify recommendations for targeting individuals who possess these traits, two of which are difficult to measure during selection—interpersonal intelligence and cross-cultural capability. A demographic profile of the Special Forces Regiment emphasizes shortfalls where more targeted recruitment may help. Through recruiter reorganization, establishment of a referral system, more accurate advertising, adoption of a long-term engagement strategy, and renewed leader involvement, SF recruiting can more effectively target those who already possess high UW potential. As it is paramount to find the right individuals for UW, targeted recruitment will help improve the short and long-term health of the Regiment.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

APFT	Army Physical Fitness Test
ARSOF	Army Special Operations Forces
ASVAB	Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery
BUD/S	Basic Underwater Demolition / SEAL School
DA	Direct Action
GT	General Technical
IW	Irregular Warfare
MAVNI	Military Accessions to National Interest
MOS	Military Occupational Specialty
NAVSPECWAR	Naval Special Warfare
NPS	Non-Prior Service or Naval Postgraduate School
NSWRD	Naval Special Warfare Recruiting Directorate
OG	Operational Group
OSS	Office of Strategic Services
SACO	Sino-American Cooperation Organization
SAS	Special Air Service
SEAL	Sea, Air, and Land
SF	Special Forces
SFAS	Special Forces Assessment and Selection
SFOT	Special Forces
SFOD-D	Special Forces Operational Detachment – Delta (Delta Force)
SFQC	Special Forces Qualification Course
SO	Special Operations
SOCOM	Special Operations Command
SOF	Special Operations Forces
SOPC	Special Operations Preparatory and Conditioning
SORB	Special Operations Recruiting Battalion
SORC	Special Operations Recruiting Company
SPPI	SEAL Production Process Improvement
SQT	SEAL Qualification Training

UDT	Underwater Demolition Team
USAJFKSWCS	U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School
USAREC	United States Army Recruiting Command
USASOC	United States Army Special Operations Command
UW	Unconventional Warfare

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I. INTRODUCTION

This thesis argues that actively recruiting talent for Unconventional Warfare (UW) will enhance the future effectiveness of the U.S. Army Special Forces Regiment.¹ Recruitment of candidates who already possess traits well-suited for UW will provide the raw material to produce more talented UW warriors. Analysis of several former and current units with UW missions suggests four different traits common to the most talented UW units: motivation, interpersonal intelligence, cross-cultural capability, and adaptability. The current selection and assessment process for SF does well at measuring motivation and adaptability and “selects out” those found deficient. However, limited focus is placed on interpersonal intelligence or cross-cultural capability beyond the ability to work together on small teams of similar individuals. Most importantly, if these two traits are innate, the candidates without them at the start of training will continue to lack them after training is complete.

SF recruitment faces several challenges today. First, recruitment does not specifically focus on the traits common for successful UW. Next, the source population for SF recruits—namely soldiers who demonstrate a propensity to join SF—is growing smaller and more homogenous; statistical analysis of the current Special Forces Regiment proves this fact. Third, two different organizations commanded by the U.S. Army Recruiting Command (USAREC) recruit for SF and use a limited number of SF qualified recruiters. Fourth, recruitment lacks an effective referral system whereby current SF soldiers can refer trusted contacts. Fifth, advertising for SF needs to emphasize working by, with, and through indigenous forces. Finally, SF recruitment lacks a long-term engagement strategy to inspire the next generation of Green Berets who are today in junior high and high school.

¹ Unconventional warfare is a subcomponent of irregular warfare and is defined in this thesis as “activities conducted to enable a resistance movement or insurgency to coerce, disrupt or overthrow a government or occupying power by operating through or with an underground, auxiliary or guerrilla force in a denied area.” See Mark Grdovic, “Ramping Up to Face the Challenge of Irregular Warfare” *Special Warfare* 22, no. 5 (2009): 16.

This thesis does not propose that the current recruitment of SF soldiers is ineffective, but rather proposes that actively finding civilians and soldiers with the potential to become talented UW soldiers will make the regiment even better. Almost any organization, regardless of type, must find the most talented employees to maintain the advantage in a competitive environment—and to win. Unconventional warfare is no different. Only by finding those who enjoy working closely with indigenous people and who understand complex social dynamics will it be possible for SF to maximize its effectiveness fully for UW in the future.

A. THE FIRST GREEN BERETS

Formed in 1952 to infiltrate Europe and conduct UW after a Soviet invasion, many of the first men chosen for SF had previously served with the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) in World War II. They were recruited by the OSS because of their knowledge of foreign countries, especially in Eastern Europe. Following World War II, annual military conscription dropped from 250,000 in 1954 to roughly 80,000 in 1962 (Figure 1).² At the same time, the population of men between the ages of 19–25 potentially eligible for the draft grew from 8 million in 1958 to 12 million in 1964.³ With an increasing population but a smaller draft, the proportion of men conscripted fell. The broad power of the draft to pull talent from every sector of the American population slowly began to diminish. By 1964, almost 30% of men eligible for the draft had received occupational, educational, and other draft deferments.⁴ Consequently, the pool of men with unique abilities for SF diminished.

When the Army became an all-volunteer force in 1973, the collection of those who might be interested in SF further diminished. Instead of attracting from among the

² Congress of the United States, Congressional Budget Office (CBO), “The All-Volunteer Military: Issues and Performance,” (Publication Number 2960: July 2007), 5.
<http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/83xx/doc8313/07-19-MilitaryVol.pdf>.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Ibid.

wide range of men compelled to join the Army, SF drew from a smaller population of mostly combat arms soldiers. This fact would eventually affect the diversity of the regiment.

Today, the 10,052 men who make up the Special Forces Regiment display a unique profile when compared to that of the regular Army.⁵ If SF does not broaden the pool from which it recruits exceptional warriors for tomorrow, the regiment will remain a homogenous organization, even as it operates with more varied populations. To identify demographic shortfalls within the regiment, a statistical analysis was conducted using data from January 2011.




Figure 1. Annual number of military draftees and the military's total accession requirement from 1940–1962.⁶

B. GREEN BERETS TODAY⁷

The following demographic profile compares those currently in the Special Forces Regiment with non-SF males in the U.S. Army and National Guard as of January 2011.

⁵ The total number is a combination of Active Duty (8,425) and National Guard (1,627) SF soldiers and was current as of January 2011.

⁶ CBO, *The All-Volunteer Military: Issues and Performance*, 4. Accession was defined as recruits who signed contracts and reported to military basic training.

⁷ All of the data used for the following demographic analysis comparing the SF and non-SF male populations was provided by the Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC), Seaside, CA in March 2011 based on data from January 2011. Only males were analyzed because the Special Forces Regiment is an all male organization. Detailed statistical analysis can be found in Appendices A and B.

Women are not included in this comparison because they are not authorized to serve in SF. The Special Forces Regiment data was also analyzed according to Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) to identify any unusual trends within SF job specialties.

1. Age

War is usually waged by the young, and the U.S. Army consists mainly of a young workforce. Most of the active duty Army's new recruits in fiscal year 2005 were between the ages of 18 and 24, with a mean age of 20.⁸ The average age today for all non-SF men in the Army is 29.0, with over 64% of the active duty Army either 30 years of age or *younger*. In contrast, over 61% of the Special Forces Regiment are *over* 30 years of age; the average age of an active duty SF soldier is 34.02 years old (statistically significant above 26 years old; see Tables 2 and Figure 7 in Appendix A). The results are even more striking in the National Guard (Table 11 and Figure 21 in Appendix B). Seventy-eight percent of the National Guard SF soldiers are over 30 and 37% are over 40. The average age of a National Guard SF soldier is 37.9, while the average age of the remaining male soldiers in the National Guard is 30.9. These age factors indicate the maturity required for unconventional warfare and the need for prior military or life experience to aid in combat advisory duties. SF often interacts with populations that place great emphasis on age and elders. Thus, an older population of soldiers will likely have more success in building rapport. One trend is that Engineer Sergeants (18C) tend to be young but Medical Sergeants (18D) tend to be old in both active duty and the National Guard.

2. Rank

The men of SF are typically more senior in rank at the company and field grade levels than those in the rest of the U.S. Army. In fact, the minimum rank authorized for a SF operator is Sergeant (E-5). In rare circumstances, a promotable specialist (E-4) may spend a short amount of time in a SF assignment, but he is usually promoted to Sergeant

⁸ Department of Defense, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, *Population Representation in the Military Services: Fiscal Year 2005* (2007), www.humrro.org/poprep/poprep05.

soon thereafter. Of significance, over 50% of the active duty men in SF are Sergeants First Class (E-7)—almost five times the number present in the rest of the Army (all data statistically significant; see Table 3 and Figure 8 in Appendix A for active duty and Table 12 and Figure 22 in Appendix B for National Guard). Indeed, nearly 70% of the non-SF population are E-5 or below.

3. Race and Ethnicity

It is difficult to attain ethnic and racial diversity for an all-volunteer SOF unit inside an all-volunteer military. Moreover, SF should never dictate a quota or lower standards merely to achieve diversity.⁹ Yet, diversity in a unit charged with interacting with different cultures and countries is critically important. In addition to meeting general recruitment efforts, racial and ethnic diversity within the Special Forces Regiment can bring to bear greater cultural and linguistic understanding and influence to both allies and adversaries. Also, the ability for nonwhite men to blend into foreign populations may help reduce the signature of a SF unit during combat operations.

The U.S. Army has been at the forefront of diversity since being desegregated by Executive Order Number 9981 in 1948.¹⁰ Challenges remain. Minorities have historically been underrepresented in SF.¹¹ In addition, they are often overrepresented in noncombat arms branches of the Army. In contrast, white soldiers are overrepresented in combat arms units and have represented a disproportionately larger number of combat fatalities in Afghanistan and Iraq.¹² This trend likely affects SF because the regiment is 84.5% white,

⁹ Sheila Nataraj Kirby, Margaret C. Harrell, and Jennifer Sloan, “Why Don't Minorities Join Special Operations Forces?” *Armed Forces & Society* 26, no. 4 (2000): 542–543. The authors’ focus groups of minority SOF operators were the most opposed to lowering any standards, since the result would create an environment in which “all minorities would be viewed as substandard and suspect.”

¹⁰ The Office of Army Demographics (OAD), “The Changing Profile of the Army: 1985–2008,” 2008.

¹¹ See Harrell, Margaret, Sheila Kirby, Jennifer Sloan, Clifford Graff II, Christopher McKelvey, and Jerry Sollinger, *Barriers to Minority Participation in Special Operations Forces* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1999), 21–33. They found in FY1997 that within the eligible populations of potential volunteers, which they called source populations (i.e., recruits that met the physical, age, rank, ASVAB score, and discipline record standards), minorities were underrepresented in SF compared to their source population and the underrepresentation was serious for blacks. Interestingly, they found that SFAS success rates were lower for minorities, but the voluntary withdraw rates were also lower than for whites, indicating that once at SFAS, the commitment rate among minorities was high.

¹² CBO, “The All-Volunteer Military: Issues and Performance,” 24.

compared to 72.2% white for non-SF Army males. Of note, roughly 8% (677 men) of the active duty SF population were reported to be “race unknown” and 2.9% (47 men) in the National Guard. If nonwhite, these outliers could boost the numbers of minorities within Special Forces.

Blacks represent the largest male racial minority in the Army (18%) but comprise a very small portion of the SF population (4.6%). Within all of SF, blacks rose above this percentage in only two jobs: Intelligence Sergeant (7.3 %) and Warrant Officer (6.1 %). Of the four initial-entry enlisted SF MOSs, blacks were more likely to be Weapons Sergeants (5.2% of 18Bs were black) and least likely to be Medical Sergeants (1.9% of 18Ds were black). Black officers comprise only 3.4% of the SF officer population (all data statistically significant; see Table 4 and Figure 10 in Appendix A for active duty and Table 13 and Figure 24 in Appendix B for National Guard).

General recruitment challenges identified within the black community may have contributed to this low representation in SF.¹³ Within the National Guard, blacks compose only 2.8% of the SF population, compared with the 11.4% in the male National Guard population overall. In National Guard SF units, blacks were more likely to be Warrant Officers (5.6% of 180As were black) or Communication Sergeants (5.2% of 18Es were blacks), but were least likely to be SF officers (1.2% of 18As were black) or Medical Sergeants (1.3% of 18Ds were black). Only three black SF officers and three black Medical Sergeants serve throughout the National Guard SF.

The variance between SF and the Army overall was less dramatic for Asians who comprise approximately 3.7% of the active duty male Army population (see Figure 11 in Appendix A for active duty and Figure 25 in Appendix B for National Guard). Their representation within SF is 2.1 percent. Within the active duty SF, Asians were least likely to be Warrant Officers (0.6%) or Engineer Sergeants (1.2%). Asians composed

¹³ See the Office of Army Demographics (OAD), “FY2009 Army Profile,” September 30, 2009, 7. Since 9/11, the number of blacks who had indicated they would likely join the Army declined from 11% in 2001 to 8% in 2008. In addition, surveyed black youth indicated that people they viewed as “influencers” in their decision to join (parents, grandparents, etc.) were less likely to recommend the Army as a career than they were in the past. Surveys from the Joint Advertising, Market Research and Studies (JAMRS) also indicated that the decrease from “influencers” was related to attitudes about the role of the Army in war and the likelihood of casualties on the battlefield.

approximately 2.7% of SF officers on Active Duty. Within the National Guard, numbers were lower and not statistically significant. Asians comprise 1.8% of the SF population compared to 2.2% in the National Guard as a whole. They are significantly underrepresented as SF officers, Warrant Officers, and Intelligence Sergeants (with only one in each MOS), but can be said to be “overrepresented” as Communication Sergeants (2.8%).

American Indians and Native Alaskans are relatively few in number in SF and comprise only 0.81% of the total active duty SF population (68 men). This is nearly identical to their overall representation within the active duty Army at 0.82% and results were not statistically significant (see Figure 12 in Appendix A for active duty and Figure 26 in Appendix B for National Guard). American Indians and Native Alaskans were scarcest as SF Officers and Weapons Sergeants, with only 0.48% (8 men) listed as 18As and 1.1% (14 men) as 18Bs. Within the National Guard, only six American Indians or Native Alaskans serve, with none serving as Warrant Officers, Weapons Sergeants, Medical Sergeants, or Intelligence Sergeants.

Hispanics comprise 7.2% of the SF population, compared to 11.2% for the rest of the active duty Army (see Table 5 and Figure 13 in Appendix A). Within active duty SF, more Hispanics were Intelligence Sergeants (12.2% of 18Fs were Hispanic) or Weapons Sergeants (10.2% of 18Bs were Hispanic), while comparatively few were SF officers (4.1% of 18As were Hispanic) or senior Non-Commissioned Officers (5.8% of 18Zs were Hispanic). Within the National Guard, Hispanics make up approximately 2–3% of most of the SF MOSs, with the exception of senior Non-Commissioned Officers (4.5% of 18Zs were Hispanic) and officers again (1.9% of 18As were Hispanic) (see Table 14 and Figure 27 in Appendix B). Outside of the senior Non-Commissioned Officer ranks in the National Guard, Hispanics are severely underrepresented as officers and senior NCOs in the Special Forces Regiment. This trend may be worthy of concern since these two MOSs constitute the core of the senior leadership within the regiment. The Hispanic population

is the largest minority within the United States and is projected to grow in the next decade. Thus, the underrepresentation of Hispanics in the leadership of SF may unnecessarily impact SF's ability to wield influence in South America.¹⁴

4. Education

SF soldiers must endure an extremely long training cycle before they become qualified Green Berets; in some cases, training lasts up to two years. Therefore, it is not surprising that they have a more robust educational profile than is found in the rest of the Army (See Table 6 and Figure 14 in Appendix A). The Special Forces Regiment has nearly double the rate of earned bachelor's degrees than the rest of the Army (33% to 18%, respectively). Although the overall education level was generally higher for active duty SF when compared to the active duty Army, percentages of officers with master's degrees was significantly higher (35% compared to 6%). However, SF has three times fewer PhDs, (0.06% compared with 0.19% within the active duty Army). Of the four initial-entry enlisted Special Forces MOSs, Medical Sergeants ranked highest for bachelor's degrees (17.6%) while Weapons Sergeant ranked the lowest (6.6%).

The educational profile for the National Guard Special Forces is even more impressive, with more than double the overall rate for bachelor's degrees, 35% versus 15% (See Table 15 and Figure 28 in Appendix B). Of note, senior Non-Commissioned Officers in the National Guard SF have almost twice the rate of master's degrees earned compared to the rest of the National Guard (4.5% versus 2.4%). In addition, the ratio of PhDs within the National Guard SF (0.5%) was actually higher than that in the rest of the National Guard (0.3%).

5. Family

Since SF soldiers are usually older and more senior ranking, they are more likely to be married with more dependents than other soldiers (see Tables 7–8 and Figures 15–18 in Appendix A for active duty and Tables 16–17 and Figures 29–32 in Appendix B for National Guard). Nearly three out of every four active duty SF soldiers are married,

¹⁴ The Office of Army Demographics (OAD), "FY2009 Army Profile," September 30, 2009, 9.

compared to just 60.3% for the rest of the Army. In addition, only 19.9% of the active duty SF has never been married compared to 35% in the rest of the Army. The Special Forces Regiment is often cited as having a much higher divorce rate than the Army overall. While the rate is statistically higher, it is not considerably higher than the non-SF Army population (6.1% versus 4.5%).¹⁵ SF soldiers have statistically significant greater numbers of dependents when compared to non-SF Active–Duty or the National Guard soldiers.¹⁶

6. Country of Birth

The 10th Special Forces Group (Airborne), SF’s first unit, was comprised of both U.S. citizens and Eastern European refugees. The Lodge Act, passed in 1950, authorized 2,500 Eastern European migrants to serve in the U.S. military and earn their citizenship after five years of successful military service.¹⁷ In exchange, these refugees would provide “language capability, area knowledge, and cultural expertise” to aid the SF in unconventional warfare operations against the Soviets throughout Europe.¹⁸ Although this U.S. “foreign legion” was never fully utilized as a behind-the-lines force in Europe, a similarly recruited force of first and second-generation Americans could provide SF with an equally relevant force for the environment today. However, such a U.S. foreign legion would require recruiting from different from sources today.¹⁹

¹⁵ This data only represents the current marriage status and does not take into account previous marriages. Therefore, the analysis was unable to determine the total number of divorces per soldier. The divorce rate was statistically significant and higher at a sensitivity level, α , of 0.01 for both active duty and National Guard.

¹⁶ Data analyzed was the number of dependents for SF and non-SF populations on active duty and in the National Guard (1, 2, 3, 4, or 5+ dependents). SF showed statistically greater numbers of two, three, and four dependents at a sensitivity level of 0.01; see Appendices A and B.

¹⁷ Trevor O. Robichaux, “Special Forces Recruiting: The Operational Need for Targeted Recruitment of First and Second Generation Americans” (Master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, December 2008), 16–18.

¹⁸ Ian D. Sutherland, *Special Forces of the United States Army* (San Jose, CA: R. James Bender Publishing, 1990), 25.

¹⁹ For a detailed analysis of the benefits that first and second generation Americans may be able to provide to SF, see Trevor O. Robichaux, “Special Forces Recruiting: The Operational Need for Targeted Recruitment of First and Second Generation Americans” (Master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, December 2008).

Only 4.6% of SF soldiers were born in a foreign country. In contrast, the non-SF active duty Army has 5.2% of its male soldiers who were foreign born. While birth outside of the United States does not guarantee an individual will better understand the culture and language of his native country, an increased likelihood exists that an individual will at least be more familiar with some of its customs. Both SF and non-SF personnel are more likely to have been born in Germany, Puerto Rico, and the Republic of Korea than anywhere else outside of the United States. However, many foreign-born non-SF personnel are also from Mexico and the Philippines. In both SF and non-SF populations, African and South American countries are notably underrepresented (See Table 9 and Figure 19 in Appendix A).

7. U.S. Regional Distribution

One concern with analyzing where Army personnel come from in the United States is the fact that many men have become state residents based on their previous or current Army assignments. They do not necessarily remain residents of the state of their youth. In addition, soldiers find states with no state income tax to be extremely attractive, even though the state may have had little or no effect on their upbringing. Still, nearly two-thirds of all active duty SF soldiers claim residency in the Southwest and Southeast, which is nearly double the rate for the rest of the Army.

The South has historically been a strong recruiting base for the Army, even though the qualification rates for recruits from other regions is higher.²⁰ Promilitary sentiment is often strong in the South, in addition to the fact that most bases are located there.²¹ Thus, even if the data for SF is biased because of the locations of Fort Bragg (NC), Fort Campbell (KY), Fort Carson (CO), Fort Lewis (WA), and Eglin AFB (FL), half of the male Army population from which SF will recruit is located in the Southwest and Southeast. The Northeast and West are particularly underrepresented among active duty SF personnel (see Table 10 and Figure 20 in Appendix A). In contrast, the two

²⁰ Mark Eitelberg, Janice Laurence, Brian Waters, and Linda Perelman, *Screening for Service: Aptitude and Education Criteria for Military Entry* (Washington, DC: Human Resources Research Organization, 1984), 83.

²¹ Eitelberg et al., *Screening for Service: Aptitude and Education Criteria for Military Entry*, 83.

National Guard SF groups, which are more evenly dispersed throughout the United States, have a more diverse regional distribution (see Table 18 and Figure 33 in Appendix B).

8. Demographic Summary

The Special Forces Regiment comprises only 1.49% of the entire active duty Army and only 0.44% of the National Guard. It is an older force, more senior in rank, and more educated than the rest of the Army or National Guard. Active duty SF soldiers average 34 years of age while National Guard SF soldiers average 38 years of age. As expected, the regiment has men of higher rank (70% of active duty are E-7 or higher with 66% for the National Guard). One third of all SF soldiers have already earned a bachelor's degree, while over one third of SF officers have a master's degree. National Guard SF soldiers have twice the rate of master's degrees and PhDs as the rest of the National Guard. Roughly three quarters of the men in SF are currently married (13% more than in the rest of the active duty Army) with more dependents, while the number of men currently divorced is only marginally higher in SF (~2%). Most of the men within SF are state residents of the Southeast and Southwest. Although this residency may not reflect where they were raised, a historic dearth of soldiers come from the Northeast and West within SF.

Of note, racial and ethnic minorities are almost universally underrepresented within SF when compared to the potential applicant pool of males within the Army and National Guard overall; this fact is especially true for blacks (comparisons are nearly all statistically significant at sensitivity level of 0.01 in Appendices A and B). Surveying how many foreign-born soldiers serve in active duty SF units clearly points to a missed recruiting opportunity. While the Special Forces Regiment was originally formed using non-citizen refugees in the 1950s, today's regiment has very few first-generation Americans (<5%). Of those foreign born, most were born in countries with a U.S. military garrison: Germany, Korea, and Puerto Rico. Notably, active duty SF has almost

no foreign-born men from either Africa or South America.²² By targeting recruitment efforts towards these populations, possibly through engagement with diasporas or academia, SF could bring more culturally capable individuals to the regiment.

²² Data were not available on foreign-born SF soldiers within the National Guard.

II. UNCONVENTIONAL WARRIORS (PAST AND PRESENT)

From the beginning, Irregular Warfare (IW) has been an important component to U.S. national defense.²³ During the Revolutionary War, Nathanael Greene's militia bled the British Army as the Redcoats gave chase across North Carolina, while the "Swamp Fox" Francis Marion launched guerrilla attacks on key British supply lines in South Carolina.²⁴ Over 150 years later, fewer than 300 men of the U.S. Office of Strategic Services (OSS) led an unconventional war against the Nazis to pave the way for the Normandy invasion. At that same time in China, U.S. advisors and their local guerrillas killed 27,000 and wounded 11,000 Japanese soldiers without losing a single U.S. soldier to enemy fire.²⁵ These soldiers are the bookends of U.S. irregular warfare that laid the groundwork for the U.S. Army SF's more recent UW campaign that toppled Afghanistan's Taliban regime in 2001. Among the constants has been the strategic effect that a small group of soldiers can have on the IW battlefield.

Success in unconventional warfare is different from success in conventional war. Victory is not measured by the number of soldiers or the destructiveness of weapon systems deployed, but depends on the wits of those fighting. Even as technology,

²³ Irregular Warfare is "a violent struggle among state and nonstate actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant population(s). IW favors indirect and asymmetric approaches, though it may employ the full range of military and other capacities in order to erode an adversary's power, influence and will." Also, five subordinate categories comprise IW: counterinsurgency (COIN); counterterrorism (CT); foreign internal defense (FID); stability operations (SO); and unconventional warfare (UW). This thesis focuses on the UW component of irregular warfare; see Mark Grdovic "Ramping Up to Face the Challenge of Irregular Warfare" *Special Warfare* 22, no. 5 (2009): 15–16.

²⁴ Greene never actually defeated British General Cornwallis' force of approximately 1,900 Redcoats, but Greene's militia killed or wounded almost a quarter of Cornwallis' men, while the harsh North Carolina winter claimed over 400 British soldiers to sickness; see Gregory J. W. Urwin, "When Freedom Wore a Red Coat: How Cornwallis' 1781 Virginia Campaign Threatened the Revolution in Virginia," in *The U.S. Army and Irregular Warfare, 1775–2007: Selected Papers from the 2007 Conference of Army Historians*, ed. Richard G. Davis (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, 2008), 63. For the "Swamp Fox" Francis Marion, see Steven J. Rauch, "Southern (Dis)Comfort: British Phase IV Operations in South Carolina and Georgia, May–September 1780," in *The U.S. Army and Irregular Warfare, 1775–2007: Selected Papers from the 2007 Conference of Army Historians*, ed. Richard G. Davis (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, 2008), 47.

²⁵ For OSS operations as Jedburgh teams see S. J. Lewis, *Jedburgh Team Operations in Support of the 12th Army Group, August 1944* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1991), 6; Dick Camp provided an estimate of the success of SACO from its leadership and can be found at Dick Camp, "SACO-American and Chinese Guerrillas in World War II," *Leatherneck* 86, no. 7 (2003): 43.

globalization, and urbanization change the character of war, unconventional warfare requires finding men capable of long-term, independent, small team efforts to advise and influence foreign forces to defeat a larger and more powerful enemy. These men must be able to operate with little guidance in austere environments.

Predicting human behavior is an inexact science; attempting to quantify who will become an excellent unconventional warrior is extremely challenging. Even if one is gifted with extraordinary tactical competence, interpersonal intelligence, and cross-cultural capability, lacking physical toughness or being unable to stay motivated could lead to failure. Much of U.S. current understanding about modern personnel assessment and selection began with work by German military psychologists on their officer selection in the 1920s. Others added much in their wake. What follows is a summation of the recruitment and selection efforts utilized for various UW and UW-like organizations, including the OSS, SACO, the Coastwatchers, SAS, the U.S. Navy SEALs, and Delta Force.

A. THE OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES (OSS)²⁶

Established to provide psychological warfare, sabotage, and subversion capabilities, the OSS borrowed certain elements from two existing British organizations, the Special Operations Executive (SOE) and the Psychological Warfare Executive (PWE). In an effort to coordinate the varied intelligence activities of the U.S. Government in 1941, Colonel William Donovan was selected by President Franklin D. Roosevelt (FDR) to become the Coordinator of Information (COI) five months before the bombing of Pearl Harbor. Donovan, “a World War I hero and a Wall Street lawyer with extensive contacts on both sides of the Atlantic and a keen interest in modern warfare,”

²⁶ Many sources for information concerning the OSS exists. For this section, information was obtained from the following sources: Edward Hymoff, *The OSS in World War II* (New York: Ballantine Books, Inc., 1972), 40, 70–71, 77, 82; H. L. Ansbacher, “Lasting and Passing Aspects of German Military Psychology.” *Sociometry* 12, no. 4 (1949): 301–303; John W. Chambers, “Office of Strategic Services Training During World War II.” *Studies in Intelligence* 54, no. 2 (2010): 2, 9–11; Sally Kuhlenschmidt, “OSS Assessment,” April 7, 2003, <http://people.wku.edu/sally.kuhlenschmidt/whimsy/oss/oss.htm>; Lewis, *Jedburgh Team Operations in Support of the 12th Army Group, August 1944*, 7–8; Donald Mackinnon, “How Assessment Centers Were Started in the United States: The OSS Assessment Program.” *Studies in Intelligence* 23, no. 3 (1979): 21–34; United States Office of Strategic Services, *Assessment of Men: Selection of Personnel for the Office of Strategic Services* (New York: Rinehart and Company, Inc., 1958), 4, 30–32, 58–60, 94–146.

quickly became the charismatic leader of COI.²⁷ In October 1941, FDR authorized Donovan to recruit and train spies, saboteurs, and guerrilla leaders for use against future enemies. As the Allies prepared for operations in North Africa and their landing in Nazi-occupied Europe, the COI began to establish and develop its intelligence networks worldwide. In the summer of 1942, FDR renamed the COI the OSS and gave it sole responsibility for all covert activities.

Donovan developed two types of covert irregular warfare elements for the OSS, the Special Operations (SO) teams and Operational Group (OG) units. SO teams worked as two or three-man teams, and were designed to focus on sabotage and subversion. In contrast, OG units were organized as 34-man sections or 15-man half sections (two officers and 13 NCOs), and were intended to be “capable of longer and more sustained independent actions.”²⁸ The SO teams were assembled after training, whereas the OGs trained as complete units. In reality, both SOs and OGs operated in a very similar manner; that is, fighting alongside resistance groups to conduct subversion, sabotage, and guerrilla warfare.

Most Americans who volunteered for the hazardous missions of the SO or OG were citizen soldiers from the wartime military. Most had already completed basic military training, and many also had advanced training. The challenge for the OSS was with career soldiers. Many military career officers who joined the OSS were too set in their ways for the dynamic environment of a cutting-edge organization. Fortunately, Donovan recognized the need for audacious, rule-breaking individuals. After a significant number of law enforcement and career military members left the OSS, the OSS began to rely more on citizen soldiers rather than “already established, fulltime, career professionals in the officer corps.”²⁹

Donovan’s initial recruiting efforts included finding “administrators from the private sector who had made their mark in their respective professions.”³⁰ This method

²⁷ Chambers, “Office of Strategic Services Training During World War II,” 2.

²⁸ Ibid., 9–10.

²⁹ Ibid., 11.

³⁰ Hymoff, *The OSS in World War II*, 77.

led to renowned economists, lawyers, politicians, movie stars, athletes, royalty, and even Nobel Laureates joining the OSS. The OSS sought out those Americans with knowledge or expertise in specific areas, such as academia, science, politics, or industry. Initially, the OSS targeted potential administrators who could be trusted to keep secret the U.S. financial support of resistance movements worldwide; however, in late 1942, more personnel were recruited for activities behind enemy lines than for administrative positions. Consequently, the need for smart Americans who understood foreign languages grew. Often, the best place to find such individuals was in the upper socio-economic brackets; especially suitable were highly educated professionals who could afford to travel in contrast to the nearly 60 percent of the American population who had only an elementary school education.³¹

Recruiting for the OSS occurred through three channels: the Personnel Procurement Branch (PPB), the Civilian Personnel Branch (CPB), and internal OSS individual recruitment. The PPB recruited exclusively from the military. Screening out misfits took time, especially with “psychopaths who have a special talent to make a good impression over brief periods of time.”³² Unfortunately, each recruiter in the PPB had his own idea of what OSS operations required. Therefore, many recruiters held conflicting notions about whom to recruit as their ideal applicants. Thus, recruiters were forced to attend one day of assessment to observe one another. At the same time, simple organizational frictions worked against the PPB recruiters; some requests for transfers were blocked by the normal military bureaucratic red tape.

³¹ Hymoff, *The OSS in World War II*, 82. However, the late evolutionary biologist Stephen Gould countered this claim; he described Colonel Robert Yerkes who attempted to validate psychology during World War I by testing the intelligence of 1.75 million Army recruits. Yates oversaw the development of the Army Alpha test for literate recruits and the Army Beta test, which was designed for illiterates who failed the Alpha test. A graduated grading scale (from A to E) offered suggestions for appropriate job placement within the Army. The results were largely ignored except in officer selection, where numbers swelled from 9,000 to 200,000. When Yerkes’ “mass-produced written tests of intelligence...the era of mass testing had begun.” After detailed analysis of 160,000 cases from the Army, Yerkes’s staff concluded that the average mental age of white American adults was thirteen. Yet, his testing method was highly questionable. His tests measured familiarity with American culture, not a true measure of intelligence for a recent immigrant. For an excellent argument against the innate IQ testing of the early 1900s and the result of environmental factors on human flexibility, see Stephen J. Gould, *The Mismeasure of Man* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1981).

³² Mackinnon, “How Assessment Centers Were Started in the United States: OSS Assessment Program,” 25.

The CPB recruited mostly civilian men and women to serve as secretaries and stenographers. Not surprisingly, most of these were women. The CPB generally used “vaguely worded newspaper and magazine advertising” to find applicants.³³ In addition to the CPB, OSS members routinely recommended friends, family, and acquaintances for job openings. This internal recruitment was only effective, however, if the OSS member was a good judge of personality and character; often, this process was plagued by personal favoritism and did not result in what was best for the OSS.

Essentially, this method of recruiting was like fishing with a large net, resulting in a lot of bycatch. Communists, Socialists, and Marxists all made their way into the OSS, along with many first-generation American artists, mechanics, and former law enforcement officers looking for adventure. Well-educated individuals who appeared suitable for OSS operations, but lacked the ability to deal with uncertainty, began to find their way into the field as well. Taken from their civilian lives, these members were often given expedited training and learned the rules of covert operations extemporaneously. Reports of agent incompetence and mental breakdowns increased.

In September 1943, the OSS needed to build its SO teams (aka Jedburgh) for infiltration into Nazi-occupied France. The OSS, in coordination with the British SOE, developed training grounds in Great Britain and recruited 55 suitable officer volunteers to command the Jedburgh teams; only 35 completed the training.³⁴ Their recruitment was guided by the following selection criteria:

Officers should be picked for qualities of leadership and daring, ability to speak and understand French, and all-around physical condition. They should be experienced in handling men, preferably in an active theater of operations, and be prepared to be parachuted in uniform behind enemy lines and operate on their own for some time. They must have at least basic military training and preferably have aptitude for small arms weapons.³⁵

³³ Office of Strategic Services, *Assessment of Men*, 60.

³⁴ Lewis, *Jedburgh Team Operations in Support of the 12th Army Group, August 1944*, 7.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, 7–8.

Even with such significant operational requirements, by late 1943, the OSS was still not using any professional or uniform screening process for OSS recruits. It developed elaborate training facilities, both in the United States and overseas, but individuals still completed the training only to fail overseas—often resulting in death. This scenario changed only after an OSS official in Britain visited a British War Office Selection Board (WOSB) where potential officer candidates were tested for the British Army. The WOSB staff of psychiatrists and psychologists lived together with the candidates in an attempt to predict their behavior. The British WOSB selection process was based on work previously done by German military psychologists.

As early as 1918, the German military recognized the importance of officer personality and developed a “large-scale selection method for officer candidates.”³⁶ The scientific director of German psychology, Dr. Max Simoneit, required high technical and personality ratings for all officer applicants. German military psychology concluded that personality had to be studied as a whole, which produced a unique selection procedure. Thorough personal background information obtained by observation and interaction with candidates, often in various group situations, was combined with results from numerous tests. The candidates were observed by several different evaluators over two to three days, and lived at the testing location during their assessment. In addition, the assessment was conducted “in a friendly atmosphere which facilitated spontaneous behavior and human interaction.”³⁷ Lessons from the German and British selection procedures eventually produced the seminal OSS psychological assessment program.

The OSS was reorganized into nine different branches in January 1943, and the Schools and Training (S&T) Branch was given responsibility for assessing and training recruits. S&T organized a psychological-psychiatric assessment unit in November 1943, located at Station S, a country estate in Fairfax County, Virginia.³⁸ There, candidates were assessed during 3½ days of testing to determine “not only their mental and physical

³⁶ H. L. Ansbacher, “Lasting and Passing Aspects of German Military Psychology,” *Sociometry* 12, no. 4 (1949): 301.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, 303.

³⁸ Chambers, “Office of Strategic Services Training During World War II,” 11.

aptitude but their judgment, independence, emotional stability, and ability to act effectively under pressure.”³⁹ The staff developed nine dimensions of assessment: motivation, practical intelligence, emotional stability, social relations, leadership, physical ability, observation and reporting, propaganda skills, and maintaining cover. Other dimensions sometimes used were recruiting or teaching ability. Each dimension was rated using a six-point Likert scale: very inferior, inferior, low average, high average, superior, and very superior.⁴⁰

Candidates recruited for selection shared some general characteristics. Most were of above-average intelligence, and half had visited foreign countries. One in five had traveled to Europe, one in 20 had visited Africa or Asia, and one in 10 had traveled to Latin America. In addition, one in eight had been to two or more continents, and one-fifth had spent five or more years overseas. Many were foreign born or were political refugees. One quarter spoke a foreign language fluently, and one in 12 spoke two or more languages. Compartmentalization by the assessment staff meant that if recruits were weeded out, they would know little about OSS methods.⁴¹

The recruits (both men and women) were formed into classes of roughly 18 candidates at Station S and were instructed never to reveal their real identities while there. Psychological tests, similar to those used today, helped build a detailed personal history and personality description. Candidates were often divided into subgroups for purposes of assessment: saboteurs (generally more athletic), spies (generally more educated, less athletic), and potential propagandists (generally immigrants and more artistic).⁴² The assessment team observed each candidate through various tasks and tests. For example, the Brook Situation required a group of candidates to cross a stream (simulated canyon) carrying a log (simulated important piece of equipment) and return with a rock (simulated explosives); all members were required to do so within a specified

³⁹ Chambers, “Office of Strategic Services Training During World War II,” 11.

⁴⁰ Office of Strategic Services, *Assessment of Men*, 32.

⁴¹ Hymoff, *The OSS in World War II*, 82.

⁴² Sally Kuhlenschmidt, “OSS Assessment,” April 7, 2003, <http://people.wku.edu/sally.kuhlenschmidt/whimsy/oss/oss.htm>.

amount of time without designating a leader. The Wall Situation challenged the same group to cross over a high wall with similar restrictions. The Construction Situation required candidates to direct two assistants in the construction of a simple wooden structure within 10 minutes, but in this case, the role-playing assistants would remain disobedient. Another test was the Stress Interview. Candidates were given a short amount of time in which to develop a cover story for why they had been found going through secret papers in a government office building.⁴³

Numerous other tests were administered, and each had a different aim. For instance, some tests included the OWI test (for cultural-sensitivity), map memory test (observe and report), mechanical comprehension test (intelligence), Manchuria test (propaganda), discussion (verbal resourcefulness), and teaching tests.⁴⁴ The most important hurdle for every candidate during assessment was the clinical interview by a psychologist; this interview weighed more heavily in the candidate's final personality rating than did anything else. Even the graduation party, at which alcohol was served, involved the assessment team's efforts to expose a candidate's cover story.⁴⁵ Essentially, Station S can be considered one giant simulation, with each candidate having the task of consistently acting as a person he or she was not. In the end, the assessment of each candidate at Station S was not based on any possessed specific skills for a particular job, but rather on the whole man or woman and their strengths and weaknesses in general situations. Station S began assessing in December 1943 and screened 5,391 recruits by August 1945.⁴⁶

Due to the OSS's heavy manpower requirement, Station S and its 3½-day program could not assess all the recruits needed for OSS operations worldwide. Thus, in March 1944, a one-day assessment center, Station W, was established near Washington to assess candidates destined for headquarters or rear bases assignments, rather than field operations. Two months later, Station WS was established in Laguna Beach, California,

⁴³ Kuhlenschmidt, "OSS Assessment," April 7, 2003.

⁴⁴ Office of Strategic Services, *Assessment of Men*, 94–146.

⁴⁵ Kuhlenschmidt, "OSS Assessment," April 7, 2003.

⁴⁶ Hymoff, *The OSS in World War II*, 82.

to assess applicants recruited in the West.⁴⁷ Over time, the OSS's evaluation teams learned that what made OSS members most effective as saboteurs in France, spies in Germany, commandos in Burma, or clandestine radio-operators in China, was "a secure, capable, intelligent and creative person who could deal effectively with uncertainty and considerable stress."⁴⁸

Since the OSS asked much of its operators, trying to find the right person for each mission was an extremely challenging task. The difficulty in predicting human behavior in combat environments under time-constrained assessment periods cannot be overstated. Yet, the OSS successfully conducted many strategic operations under complex and dangerous conditions that greatly aided in the defeat of both Germany and Japan. Worth noting is that even though the screening process implemented by the OSS Assessment Staff for recruiting and selecting the best OSS agents was critical to the OSS helping to win WWII, the staff still concluded its ability to predict overseas performance was limited.⁴⁹

B. SINO-AMERICAN COOPERATIVE ORGANIZATION (SACO)

The state of U.S. influence in the Pacific was at a low point after Pearl Harbor. The Pacific fleet was destroyed and Japan had greatly expanded its Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.⁵⁰ With most U.S. military resources destined for Europe by early 1942, the War Department pursued alternative means to fight the Japanese.⁵¹ The Navy,

⁴⁷ Mackinnon, "How Assessment Centers were started in the United States: OSS Assessment Program," 25.

⁴⁸ Chambers, "Office of Strategic Services Training During World War II," 11.

⁴⁹ Mackinnon, "How Assessment Centers were started in the United States: OSS Assessment Program," 33. Even with all of the resources available to the OSS Assessment staff, more recent (1973) statistical analysis indicated that if Station S (3½-day assessment program) had used only random selection of personnel, they would have correctly placed agents 63% of the time, but they were actually correct 77% of the time (+14% difference). By contrast, Station W (1-day assessment program) would have randomly been correct 66% of the time while it was actually 84% correct (+18%). Researchers were unable to determine why the shorter 1-day assessments of Station W were more accurate than the longer 3½-day assessments of Station S. Differences in procedures, staff competency due to more psychiatrists at Station W, or differences among the populations assessed may or may not have been a factor.

⁵⁰ Oscar P. Fitzgerald, "Naval Group China: A Study of Guerrilla Warfare During World War II" (Master's thesis, Georgetown University, February 1968), 1.

⁵¹ Fitzgerald, "Naval Group China: A Study of Guerrilla Warfare During World War II," 1.

for instance, developed a plan to build a unit that would fight an unconventional war against the Japanese using guerrilla warfare, sabotage, and subversion.⁵² Initially a one-man mission, this irregular force eventually grew to over nearly 3,000 U.S. advisors, 97,000 Chinese guerrillas, and 20,000 Chinese pirates and saboteurs.⁵³ By mid-1943, Captain Milton Miles' Sino-American Cooperative Organization (SACO) was entrenched throughout China with weather stations, lookout posts, and guerrilla bases. These facilities yielded an elaborate intelligence network that reported weather conditions to Allied forces and disrupted Japanese operations via guerrilla warfare. In little more than a year of combat operations, the Chinese guerrillas and their U.S. advisors would engage the Japanese forces more than 1,000 times. Their results were incredible—27,000 Japanese soldiers killed, 11,000 wounded, and 500 captured without one U.S. serviceman killed by enemy fire.⁵⁴ The results made SACO guerrillas the most efficient force in the Far East. More Japanese were killed and more Japanese material destroyed with a smaller loss of men than any other unit in the entire China-Burma-India Theater.⁵⁵

As the U.S. Navy began to formulate its long-term plan to defeat the Japanese via China, the first directive was to disrupt Japanese shipping by mining the Chinese coast, inland waterways, and harbors of Formosa. In addition, the plan called for gaining intelligence and disrupting Japanese forces in preparation for an American invasion. Most importantly, the Navy needed accurate weather reports to allow the U.S. Pacific Fleet to forecast air and sea operations east of China. Naval Captain Milton E. Miles was also tasked to survey the Chinese coast to identify potential landing beaches and test new anti-ship mines.⁵⁶ Admiral King personally asked Miles to:

⁵² Roy O. Stratton, *SACO: The Rice Paddy Navy* (Pleasantville, NY: C. S. Palmer Publishing Co., 1950), 1.

⁵³ U.S. China Group Naval Veterans, "SACO Sino-American Cooperative Organization," January 30, 2011, <http://saconavy.com/history.htm>.

⁵⁴ Dick Camp, "SACO-American and Chinese Guerrillas in World War II," *Leatherneck* 86, no. 7 (2003): 43.

⁵⁵ Fitzgerald, "Naval Group China: A Study of Guerrilla Warfare During World War II," 112.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, iii.

[F]ind out what is going on out there ... we are going to have tough sledding out there ... You are to go to China and set up some bases as soon as you can. The main idea is to prepare the China coast in any way you can for U.S. Navy landings in three or four years. In the meantime, do whatever you can to help the Navy and heckle the Japanese.⁵⁷

Miles' own interest in the Orient began during his first naval assignment in Asia; one lesson he learned from his commanders was that no place was unimportant. He spent time traveling inland to learn about the culture and local customs in Java, Bali, Malaya, Indochina, China, Japan, and the Philippines. While recruiting men to serve in SACO, Captain Miles set as a standard that any potential recruit "must be prepared to work without friction with anyone."⁵⁸ Miles highlighted cooperation and rapport above all else, which is the reason why he prevented former China hands from joining; men who had formerly lived in China had a propensity to dominate the Chinese people rather than cooperate with them. All SACO volunteers had to be new to China. SACO recruited mostly from the naval reserves and screened for political prejudices: "respect for China's 100% sovereignty ... was one of the cardinal points in the system established by Miles for selecting his subordinates in the new organization."⁵⁹ Specialists of all kinds were recruited for SACO to include:

[A]erologists, radio technicians, amphibious and demolitions experts, dog and pigeon trainers, lawyers, doctors, dentists, chaplains, cavalrymen, air combat intelligence personnel, research men and every other highly skilled personnel that would help the Navy ... the men came from ships at sea, foreign and continental naval stations, and from every walk of life. Most were reservists, only a few from the regular armed services.⁶⁰

In addition, each man had to possess a minimum of two unique skills and one useful hobby ... "even medical personnel had to be photographers, weather men, or chaplains."⁶¹ Living conditions were difficult and volunteers were screened carefully.

⁵⁷ Milton E. Miles, *A Different Kind of War* (Garden City, N.Y., Doubleday, 1967), 18.

⁵⁸ Stratton, *SACO: The Rice Paddy Navy*, 90.

⁵⁹ Michael Schaller, "SACO! The United States Navy's Secret War in China," *Pacific Historical Review* 44, no. 4 (1975): 527–553. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3638069>.

⁶⁰ Stratton, *SACO: The Rice Paddy Navy*, 6.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*

Volunteers needed to possess “good health and rugged constitutions, particularly a good heart and digestive system.”⁶² These criteria required an American who was part marauder and part quartermaster, one who could live off the land in the winter and summer by using the materials at hand.⁶³ A member had to be physically rugged enough to walk 20 miles or more a day for an indefinite period.⁶⁴ A volunteer’s attention to duty had to be unquestioning, and he had to possess the willingness to take chances. In addition, a member of SACO had to be able to “place complete confidence in the Chinese guerrilla.”⁶⁵ Miles recollected the type of man he needed:

We want sturdy individuals, but all a little crazy. But they should be only slightly crazy-not as much as I am in order to preserve for the skipper the traditional rank has its privileges. Volunteers must be prepared to eat and live Chinese style, and expect nothing else. They must renounce drinking, as this is too dangerous a job to endeavor by dissipation. The men who come out here better be prepared for a country life among the birds and trees. They had better be pipe smokers and tea drinkers. So far we have neither cigarettes nor coffee.⁶⁶

SACO would eventually include 2,964 American servicemen from the Navy, Army, and Marines, 97,000 Chinese guerrillas, and roughly 20,000 “individualists,” such as pirates and lone-wolf saboteurs. Aided by the Chinese government, SACO supplied the Pacific Fleet with regular weather reports from many occupied areas in the Far East. The group successfully rescued 76 downed aviators. Again, 71,000 Japanese were killed as the result of actions by and information from SACO.⁶⁷

C. THE COASTWATCHERS

The Coastwatchers served as the early warning system for the resource-constrained Allies in the Pacific and greatly aided the defeat of the Japanese in the

⁶² Camp, “SACO-American and Chinese Guerrillas in World War II,” 41.

⁶³ Ibid.

⁶⁴ Stratton, *SACO: The Rice Paddy Navy*, 6.

⁶⁵ Camp, “SACO-American and Chinese Guerrillas in World War II,” 41.

⁶⁶ Miles, *A Different Kind of War*, 94.

⁶⁷ Stratton, *SACO: The Rice Paddy Navy*, 18.

Solomon Islands.⁶⁸ In fact, Admiral Halsey famously said, “the Coastwatchers saved Guadalcanal and Guadalcanal saved the South Pacific.”⁶⁹ Developed by the Royal Australian Navy after WWI, the Island Coastwatching Service comprised a network of observers who guarded the vast coastline of Australia in case of war.⁷⁰ All Coastwatchers were volunteers, and were often local government officials, merchants, and missionaries.⁷¹ They watched the strategic islands to Australia’s northeast and used “teleradios” to report any valuable information about the Japanese disposition.⁷² Their ability to build rapport with local islanders was often the only way they could escape detection by the Japanese. The Coastwatchers were collectively known as “Ferdinand” and used their intelligence networks and guerrilla forces to report vital intelligence to the Allies, harass Japanese positions, and rescue downed pilots and stranded sailors, including a future U.S. President.⁷³

In 1942, the Japanese navy was equivalent in size to that of the United States and had developed some of the most effective sea-air operations in the world.⁷⁴ The Japanese also had what many considered the best fighter aircraft and torpedoes available. Although they lacked effective radar, their night-fighting capability was highly proficient. After Pearl Harbor, the Japanese “owned” the Pacific and began bombing inside the Coastwatchers’ range at Rabaul, New Guinea, in January 1942. In the spring of that year, the Allied Intelligence Bureau (AIB) was formed to control and integrate all unconventional intelligence operations in the area, and the Coastwatchers became a

⁶⁸ John Arquilla, “The Pacific War,” in *From Troy to Entebbe: Special Operations in Ancient and Modern Times*, ed. John Arquilla (New York: University Press of America, Inc., 1996), 255–256.

⁶⁹ Eric Feldt, “The Coast Watchers,” *Royal Historical Society of Queensland Journal* 6, no. 4 (1961–1962): 778, http://espace.library.uq.edu.au/eserv/UQ:212638/s00855804_1961_1962_6_4_762.pdf.

⁷⁰ Walter Lord, *Lonely Vigil: Coastwatchers of the Solomons* (New York: The Viking Press, 1977), 5.

⁷¹ Lord, *Lonely Vigil: Coastwatchers of the Solomons*, 5.

⁷² Teleradios could transmit either by voice or telegraph key; see Lord, *Lonely Vigil: Coastwatchers of the Solomons*, 6.

⁷³ Ferdinand referred to the bull who watched and waited from the famous 1936 children’s book *Ferdinand the Bull* by Munro Leaf, see Martin Clemens, *Alone on Guadalcanal: A Coastwatcher’s Story* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1998), 4; the Coastwatchers were credited with rescuing John F. Kennedy’s crew after his patrol boat (PT-109) was sunk; see Lord, *Lonely Vigil: Coastwatchers of the Solomons*, 213–230.

⁷⁴ Feldt, “The Coast Watchers,” 765.

section of the AIB. Although the Coastwatchers' area of operations spread across both the South Pacific (commanded by Nimitz), and the Southwest Pacific (commanded by MacArthur), they "received complete support from the U.S. forces in both areas."⁷⁵ In addition, all civilian Coastwatchers were given official rank in the Australian Navy in the spring of 1942.⁷⁶

Feldt, who ensured that the men under his command were capable of operating behind enemy lines, commanded the Coastwatchers. Their ability to recruit natives and operate individually was extremely important.⁷⁷ Equally critical was their ability to remain flexible: one moment a Coastwatcher was fighting the Japanese, the next minute he was "settling a native marital dispute."⁷⁸

Planning ability was also vital since the supply lines were so tenuous. For instance, the teleradio, to include its charging engine and fuel, could only be moved via primitive means. This factor required additional native manpower, which meant added food and water. Natives were recruited to move supplies and obtain provisions from nearby villages. A Coastwatcher, therefore, was always under threat of betrayal. To survive in a foreign world, a Coastwatcher had to retain the cooperation of the natives.⁷⁹

Since living conditions were extremely challenging, only those who were young and could understand the climate survived in and around the islands. Only experienced islanders, usually Europeans who had spent at least four or five years living on an island, were successful; these men usually felt more at home in the islands than in "civilization." One of the most important qualities of a successful islander was "a capacity for deep

⁷⁵ Feldt, "The Coast Watchers," 768.

⁷⁶ Ibid., 765–768.

⁷⁷ Lord, *Lonely Vigil: Coastwatchers of the Solomons*, 9.

⁷⁸ Ibid., 10.

⁷⁹ Feldt, "The Coast Watchers," 765.

friendship;” this relationship helped islanders forge bonds among themselves.⁸⁰ They also tended to be loners who could think independently and “reacted better to personal contact than general orders.”⁸¹

The Coastwatchers and their guerrillas killed 5,414, wounded 1,492, and captured 74 Japanese while losing 37 Allies, two of whom were captured and survived, with 20 natives killed and 40 captured. In addition, the Coastwatchers rescued 75 POWs, 321 downed airmen, 280 stranded personnel, 190 civilians and missionaries, and an uncounted number of local refugees.⁸² Still, their main contribution was to supply accurate intelligence. Just a short phrase, such as “forty bombers headed yours” gave the U.S. Marines on Guadalcanal enough time to react (usually about two hours).⁸³ The results were often catastrophic for the Japanese, as their aircraft straggled back to base, sometimes with only a few left in the formation. The same Coastwatchers who reported the initial sortie would then count the number of returning aircraft. Not only did this success help boost Allied confidence, but as Eric Feldt summarized the Coastwatchers’ effect in Rabaul:

And now 40,000 Japanese were held in that same Gazelle Peninsula [Rabaul, New Guinea] by 29 Coastwatchers and 400 armed natives. Hemmed in, its command of sea and air lost, the Rabaul garrison could only sit, helpless and ignoble, the limits of its hinterland defined by puny Ferdinand.⁸⁴

⁸⁰ Eric Feldt, *The Coastwatchers* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1946), 33–34.

⁸¹ Feldt, “The Coast Watchers,” 765.

⁸² Ibid., 777–778.

⁸³ Reg Hardman and Carmody Sagers, “Behind Enemy Lines: An Amateur Radio Operator’s Amazing Tale of Bravery,” *American Radio Relay League*, June 4, 2009, <http://www.arrl.org/news/behind-enemy-lines-an-amateur-radio-operator-s-amazing-tale-of-bravery>.

⁸⁴ Feldt, *The Coastwatchers*, 241.

D. THE BRITISH SPECIAL AIR SERVICE (SAS)⁸⁵

As the founding organizational design for most of today's Special Operations units, the British Special Air Service (SAS) Regiment was originally created in 1941 by young Scottish Lieutenant David Sterling. Over subsequent decades, the SAS would be involved in numerous conflicts, from those that marked the decline of the British Empire to ongoing wars today in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya. Finding the right personnel has long proved critical to the success of the SAS, and its recruitment and selection process remain the model used by many other elite units.

SAS units operate deep behind enemy lines, often without support, and must rely on initiative and extraordinary competence to complete their missions. Adaptability, flexibility, cunning, and interpersonal skills are all as important as physical stamina and strength. The SAS adheres to three primary tenets: "the unrelenting pursuit of excellence; maintaining of the highest standards of discipline in all aspects of the daily life of a SAS soldier; the SAS brooks no sense of class and, particularly, not among the wives."⁸⁶

Determining how to recruit for its strategic and dangerous 1941 missions in North Africa devolved to David Sterling. Sterling was tasked with organizing his strike unit in Kabrit, near the Suez Canal. He had three months to train it before its first mission in November 1941. The force was designated L-Detachment, Special Air Service Brigade; even the name was a deception, designed to convince the Afrika Corps that an airborne

⁸⁵ Sources the author draws from in this section include Nigel Cawthorne, *The Mammoth Book of Inside the Elite Forces* (London: Robinson, 2008); Eliot A. Cohen, *Commandos and Politicians* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Center for International Affairs, 1978); Peter Dickens, *SAS: The Jungle Frontier* (London: Arms and Armour Press, Ltd., 1983); Tony Geraghty, *Inside the S.A.S.* (New York: Ballantine Books, 1980); Paul Harris, "Who Dares Wins' Britain's SAS in Action," *Veterans of Foreign Wars Magazine* 89, no. 6 (2002): 20–24; Bruce Horsfield, "Communication and the Postmodern Organisation: a Report of Qualitative Research on the Australian Special Air Service Regiment," *The Electronic Journal of Communication* 10, no. 1 and 2 (2000); Time Jones, *SAS: the First Secret Wars* (London: I. B. Tauris & Company, Limited, 2005); Time Jones, *SAS Zero Hour: The Secret Origins of the Special Air Service* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2006); Anthony Kemp, *The SAS at War: The Special Air Service Regiment 1941–1945* (London: John Murray Publishers, Ltd., 1991); Anthony King, "The Special Air Service and the Concentration of Military Power," *Armed Forces & Society* 35, no. 4 (2009): 646–666; John Strawson, *A History of the S.A.S. Regiment* (London: Martin Secker & Warburg Limited, 1984); James L. Velky, "Special Forces Assessment and Selection," *Special Warfare* 3, no. 1 (1990): 12–15; Alan Vick, *Snakes in the Eagles nest: A History of Ground Attacks on Air Bases* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1995); Peter Watson, *War on the Mind: The Military Uses and Abuses of Psychology* (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1978).

⁸⁶ Geraghty, *Inside the S.A.S.*, 3.

force was present. Sterling conducted initial recruitment among the Guards Commando unit garrisoned in a camp in Genefa. Recruitment was based solely on Sterling's impressions during short interviews with interested soldiers. He ensured that selected volunteers understood that if they failed to complete his training, they would return to their original units. Sterling specifically recruited his initial officer corps from officers he knew from previous assignments.

Most of those who initially joined had limited combat experience. They had cut their teeth with the Guards regiments and completed Commando training, and ranged in age from 18 to 40 years of age. L-Detachment established firm minimum standards for everyone, both officers and enlisted. When anyone failed, he was returned to his original unit (RTU), a procedure still in effect today. Sterling's establishment of a meritocracy within SAS would shape the recruitment and selection of future elite units for decades.

In the early 1950s, the SAS institutionalized its recruiting and selection procedures. The first postwar selection course, only a week long, focused on physical stamina and map reading abilities. Only with the next selection class did the SAS assess recruits for specific traits; a process very similar to that used by the Office of Strategic Services (OSS). The SAS selection course has not changed significantly to this day. Among other things, the SAS tested recruits' bodies and minds "to determine if they can operate effectively, both as individuals and as team members, while under prolonged periods of stress."⁸⁷

Recruiting for the SAS during the Borneo Campaign against Indonesia in the 1960s proved difficult, as not many soldiers knew much about what the SAS actually did, and many conventional commanders wanted to avoid the loss of some of their most competent leaders.⁸⁸ As losses and the difficulty of operations in Borneo slowly increased, manning became paramount. Although recruiting volunteers seemed to

⁸⁷ Velky, "Special Forces Assessment and Selection," 12.

⁸⁸ Dickens, *SAS: The Jungle Frontier*, 72.

improve in early 1964, the success rate for passing selection did not. For all of 1964, the SAS was in need of 66 men to outfit its operations fully in Borneo, but its recruitment efforts only netted 12 soldiers capable of passing selection.⁸⁹

Although the exact details of the British SAS selection process remain classified, the general concept is to assess a recruit's mind and body under stress. For example, during an operation in Malaya, several psychologists followed an SAS element from its HQ in Hereford, England, into Malaya to study the men's performance over several weeks of combat while performing support tasks.⁹⁰ The psychologists found that the men who performed the best upon arrival were not the same men who performed best weeks later. In addition, the psychologists found they could predict the performance of the men in a tropical climate based on studies conducted before they departed chilly and rural Hereford.⁹¹ These results were implemented into the SAS selection process to test for traits that would identify men suitable for serving abroad on short notice. HQ found that the SAS soldier functions best in a "small, family sized group that do not squander individuality."⁹² Precisely this dynamic has kept the size of each SAS maneuver element limited to four-man teams.⁹³

To describe accurately the men who volunteer for and complete SAS training is difficult. Most accepted into the SAS are in their late twenties with several years of prior military service.⁹⁴ Good judgment in spite of stress and fatigue is considered a key trait by the SAS, which is a quality that usually comes with maturity. Despite the ferocity of its selection process, the SAS Regiment has approximately 400 operators.⁹⁵ Nearly 20% of those who attempt to join the SAS actually succeed. During selection, the men are

⁸⁹ Dickens, *SAS: The Jungle Frontier*, 99.

⁹⁰ Peter Watson, *War on the Mind: The Military Uses and Abuses of Psychology* (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1978), 225.

⁹¹ *Ibid.*, 225.

⁹² Geraghty, *Inside the S.A.S.*, 227.

⁹³ Paul Harris, "Who Dares Wins' Britain's SAS in Action," *Veterans of Foreign Wars Magazine* 89, no. 6 (2002): 22.

⁹⁴ Geraghty, *Inside the S.A.S.*, 225.

⁹⁵ King, "The Special Air Service and the Concentration of Military Power," 652.

administered computational tests, the 16PF personality test, and a psycho-dynamic test.⁹⁶ Psychologists test for men who are “above average in intelligence, assertive, happy-go-lucky, self-sufficient, and not extremely intro- or extraverted.”⁹⁷ Notably, the SAS does *not* want soldiers who are emotionally stable, but rather it seeks men who are forthright, hard to fool, and not dependent on others.⁹⁸ This means the SAS’s basic philosophy for what it is looking for has not changed significantly since Major Newell drafted a paper on the subject in 1955:

Selection is designed rather to find the individualist with a sense of self-discipline than the man who is primarily a good member on a team. For the self-disciplined individualist will always fit well into a team when teamwork is required, but a man selected for team work is by no means always suitable for work outside the team.⁹⁹

Today, the SAS is open to men of any service within the British Armed Forces. This criterion provides the SAS with a number of candidates from unique backgrounds.¹⁰⁰ The selection course begins with 10 days of map reading and physical fitness at the Brecon Beacons in South Wales. The candidates begin in groups of about twenty. In the Brecon Beacons, the weather is cold and wet. There, the candidates learn to navigate in featureless terrain using only a compass and distance method, which is a skill of critical importance to the SAS. Next, the volunteers must endure solitary long-range foot movements with equipment (55 lbs rucksack and 10 lbs weapon), culminating in a 40-mile trek to be completed in less than 20 hours.¹⁰¹ Those deemed not suitable, but who have not quit, are returned to their unit (RTU) at the completion of selection.

Throughout, recruits are tested for reactions to loneliness and unusual situations when fatigued. After selection is complete, candidates must next complete 14 weeks of basic SAS skills training, followed by airborne school and survival and evasion training.

⁹⁶ Watson, *War on the Mind: The Military Uses and Abuses of Psychology*, 374.

⁹⁷ Ibid.

⁹⁸ Ibid.

⁹⁹ Geraghty, *Inside the S.A.S.*, 226.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid.

¹⁰¹ Ibid., 227.

If a candidate completes all of these qualifications, he is considered “badged” (i.e., he earns his beret and cap-badge). Even with this accomplishment, he must yet finish training in communications, linguistics, field medical care, or explosives.

During WWII, Eisenhower once wrote to those serving in the SAS, “the ruthlessness with which the enemy has attacked the SAS troops has been an indication of the injury which you were able to cause to the German armed forces both by your own efforts and by the information which you gave of German dispositions and movements.”¹⁰²

For over 60 years, the men of the SAS have held themselves to an extremely high standard that has paid strategic dividends for Britain. From Southeast Asia to the Middle East, the SAS deploy worldwide at a moment’s notice to serve Britain’s national interests. To maintain this unique capability, Britain must find the best soldiers within Britain’s military to serve in the SAS. Its methods for recruiting and selecting the right type of soldier are the bellwether for the world’s special operations forces. These high standards seem especially worth noting given the current financial crisis when limited funds and a smaller military make this effort even more difficult.

¹⁰² Strawson, *A History of the S.A.S. Regiment*, 147.

E. U.S. NAVY SEALS (SEA, AIR, & LAND)¹⁰³

Today's U.S. Navy Sea-Air-Land commandos, or SEALs, are descendents of the Navy frogmen of WWII. Those early predecessors of today's SEALs were selected because of their extensive swimming experience and conditioning. A heavy emphasis was then placed on demolitions under heightened stress levels (likely assisted by training in and around the alligator swamps of Fort Pierce, Florida). Men from the 34 Underwater Demolition Teams (UDT) of WWII formed the backbone of the first SEAL units. The first two SEAL Teams, officially activated on January 1, 1962, by President John F. Kennedy, conducted "unconventional warfare, counter-guerrilla operations, and clandestine missions in maritime and riverine environments."¹⁰⁴

In Vietnam, the SEALs began advising the South Vietnamese in "clandestine maritime operations."¹⁰⁵ They also conducted direct action missions in the Rung Sat Special Zone. All remaining UDT personnel would eventually become designated SEALs in 1983. SEALs have since participated in operations in Grenada, Panama, the Persian

¹⁰³ This section draws on the following sources: Dick Couch, *The Finishing School* (New York: Crown publishers, 2004); John Doolittle and William F. Denton, "Naval Special Warfare (NSW) Enlisted Manning Concerns: Key Elements for Successful Growth and Retention of Enlisted Personnel" (Master's thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, December 2004); Gidget Fuentes, "Navy SEALs Seek Minority Candidates," *Navy Times*, November 8, 2010, <http://www.navytimes.com/news/2010/11/navy-seal-diversity-110610w/>; Dave Hecht, "Naval Special Warfare Center Recruiting Directorate," NSW Conference for America, October 18, 2007, <http://www.navy.mil/navco/cfa08/NSW%20Conf.%20for%20America%202.pdf>; Edwin P. Hoyt, *SEALs at War* (New York: Dell Publishing, 1993); Andrea Hsu, "Navy SEALs Seek to Build Up Their Ranks," *National Public Radio*, April 9, 2007, <http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=9481756>; Lisa J. Mills and Janet D. Held, "Optimizing U.S. Navy SEAL Selection," U.S. Navy Selection & Classification Office, 46th Annual International Military Testing Association Conference October 26–28, 2004, <http://www.internationalmta.org/Documents/2004/2004072P.pdf>; NSW Center Public Affairs, "Growing the Force," *Ethos* 8 (2010): 17–19; Erick Peterson, "The Strategic Utility of U.S. Navy SEALs" (Master's thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, June 2009); Jeanette Steele, "Study Points SEAL Recruiters toward Athletes," *San Diego Union Tribune*, March 15, 2010, <http://www.signonsandiego.com/news/2010/mar/15/navys-seriously-sports/>; U.S. Navy Recruiting Command, "Navy SEALs (Sea, Air & Land)," <http://www.navy.com/careers/special-operations/seals.html>.

¹⁰⁴ Doolittle and Denton, "Naval Special Warfare (NSW) Enlisted Manning Concerns: Key Elements for Successful Growth and Retention of Enlisted Personnel" (Master's thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, December 2004), 6.

¹⁰⁵ See "Navy SEAL History," <http://www.sealswcc.com/prINTER-friendly-page/navy-seals-history.aspx>.

Gulf, Somalia, Bosnia, Haiti, Liberia, Afghanistan, and Iraq. Today, their core missions include Direct Action (DA) and Special Reconnaissance (SR), but also Unconventional Warfare (UW) and Foreign Internal Defense (FID).¹⁰⁶

SEAL training is among the most difficult to be found in any military in the world, with a selection success rate of approximately 30 percent.¹⁰⁷ The Navy focuses on recruiting “young capable athletes.”¹⁰⁸ Enlisted SEAL recruits are mostly initial entry sailors who join the Navy specifically to become SEALs. Interestingly, recruitment for officer candidates is almost unnecessary, since most officers must already have joined the Navy, are older than most enlisted recruits, and are well aware of the high standards required to pass Basic Underwater Demolition/SEAL School (BUD/S). Also, positions for officers are very limited and most officers must pass a formal screening board. Often, many officers will meet the requirements to pass BUD/S, but only those with the requisite “maturity, athletic strength and team experience, focus, and exceptional Physical Screening Test (PST) scores” are accepted.¹⁰⁹ Even so, the driving force for overall SEAL selection is not finding men with excellent social skills or aptitude for unconventional warfare. Rather, the aim is to identify exceptional athletes with a high level of fitness and mental toughness.

For a Navy recruit to become a SEAL today, he must successfully complete more than 12 months of initial training, including BUD/S, Parachute Jump School (static-line and free-fall), and SEAL Qualification Training (SQT).¹¹⁰ Unlike the U.S. Army Special

¹⁰⁶ SEALs have historically been focused on direct action and special reconnaissance missions, but recently, they have concentrated more on indirect mission that incorporate operations “by, with, and through” a surrogate or indigenous force, similar to missions more commonly conducted by U.S. Army Special Forces; see Joint Pub 3-05 “Doctrine for Joint Special Operations” http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_05.pdf; while both SEALs and U.S. Army SF can conduct the same range of mission sets (DA, SR, UW, and FID), the SEAL organization has a DA “culture” within the organization which may not be as well suited for UW operations with indigenous forces; see Peterson, “The Strategic Utility of U.S. Navy SEALs,” 15.

¹⁰⁷ Lisa J. Mills and Janet D. Held, “Optimizing U.S. Navy SEAL Selection,” U.S. Navy Selection & Classification International Office, 46th Annual International Military Testing Association Conference October 26–28, 2004, <http://www.internationalmta.org/Documents/2004/2004072P.pdf>.

¹⁰⁸ Peterson, “The Strategic Utility of U.S. Navy SEALs,” 22.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid., 24.

¹¹⁰ U.S. Navy Recruiting Command, “Navy SEALs (Sea, Air & Land).”

Forces SFAS program, the SEALs do not separate BUD/S into an initial selection and assessment phase, but utilize “Hell Week” during BUD/S as a significant selection milestone.¹¹¹ As with other SOF selection processes, SEAL candidates are continuously assessed for their organizational fit, and those found undesirable or unable to meet the high standard are dropped from training. To attend BUD/S, male volunteers must pass the initial screening process. A candidate must be no older than 28 and a U.S. citizen, must pass a physical examination for divers, and must meet physical screening test requirements.¹¹² In addition, a candidate’s eyesight must be 20/40 in his best eye and 20/70 in his worst eye, correctable to 20/25 with no color blindness. Also, each candidate must surpass a minimum ASVAB score.¹¹³

With the high demand for additional SEALs after September 11, 2001, the Navy reconsidered how to recruit men into the community. Instead of just increasing the number of recruits volunteering for SEAL training, the Navy chose to concentrate on the quality of the recruits reporting to BUD/S. Naval Special Warfare (NAVSPECWAR) began several initiatives that have dramatically improved the success rate of those volunteering for BUD/S. For instance, a SEAL Production Process Improvement (SPPI) working group was developed in 2006 to improve how to find the right men who could pass BUD/S and SQT with the expressed provision of not lowering standards to gain more SEALs.¹¹⁴

First, the Navy Recruiting Command designed a Special Operations Mentor Program at each U.S. Navy Recruiting District. This program enables any recruit in a delayed entry program to be matched with a retired SEAL, EOD, or Navy diver to ensure the recruit maintains a high level of fitness, in addition to making it easy for him to learn more about the SEALs prior to entering recruit training. In an effort to reduce recruit

¹¹¹ In five days of continuous training, SEAL candidates are only authorized four hours of sleep total.

¹¹² Includes swim 500 yards within 12 minutes 30 seconds, rest 10 minutes, 42 push-ups within 2 minutes, rest 2 minutes, 50 sit-ups within 2 minutes, rest 2 minutes, 6 pull-ups (no time limit), rest 10 minutes, 1.5 mile run within 11 minutes.

¹¹³ ASVAB score must be either 165 (GS+MC+EI) or 220 (VE+MK+MC+CS); see U.S. Navy Recruiting Command, “Navy SEALs (Sea, Air & Land).”

¹¹⁴ NSW Center Public Affairs, “Growing the Force,” *Ethos* 8 (2010): 17.
<http://www.sealswcc.com/navy-seals-ethos-magazine.aspx>.

losses prior to BUD/S, all recruits with SEAL contracts complete their basic training together in a special group, which allows a medical officer to rectify any medical problems found in the recruit's record. This special group also conducts additional physical training to reduce the normal decline in physical fitness that commonly occurs during Navy boot camp, while also keeping recruits with similar career goals together. In addition, Naval Special Warfare (NSW) established an 8-week long preparatory school following boot camp that focuses on preparing candidates physically and mentally for the challenges of BUD/S.¹¹⁵

To combat chronically low minority representation found on the SEAL Teams (or in all of SOF for that matter), the Navy hired contractors to assist with a diversity initiative. There suggestions were to renew SEAL outreach efforts to historically black colleges and universities. In addition, the SEALs also now use marketing strategies that increase awareness, screening, and recruiting in minority communities.¹¹⁶ As of May 2010, only 10% of SEAL officers are minorities (with blacks comprising only 2% of SEAL officers); minorities compose less than 20% of enlisted personnel within the NAVSPECWAR community.¹¹⁷

NSW also developed a new screening test for SEAL recruits that could predict with 97% accuracy who would likely fail BUD/S by the end of Hell Week.¹¹⁸ This new screening tool identified 20% of those who would have likely failed in previous BUD/S classes. In addition, vision standards were made more stringent because candidates with poorer vision were historically 50% less likely to complete SEAL training.

¹¹⁵ All enlisted SEAL candidates take this course in which candidates exercise five days a week, and learning running, swimming, and other testable skills at BUD/S. They also learn SEAL heritage, history, military bearing, ethics, the SEAL Ethos, mental toughness, nutrition, stretching and physical training theory.

¹¹⁶ Gidget Fuentes, "Navy SEALs Seek Minority Candidates," *Navy Times*, November 8, 2010, <http://www.navytimes.com/news/2010/11/navy-seal-diversity-110610w/>.

¹¹⁷ Fuentes, "Navy SEALs Seek Minority Candidates," *Navy Times*, November 8, 2010.

¹¹⁸ When this screening test was combined with the other predictors, the result was a new assessment –The Computerized Special Operations Resiliency Test (C-SORT). It was developed over three years to measure a candidate's tolerance for psychological adversity, or "mental toughness"; see NSW Center Public Affairs, "Growing the Force," *Ethos* 8 (2010): 17–18.

In an effort to be even more efficient, the Naval Special Warfare Recruiting Directorate (NSWRD) spent \$500,000 on a contract with Gallup, a human behavior research organization, to determine the ideal SEAL recruit. Gallup found that young men who played water polo, rock climbed, or mountain biked were more likely to pass SEAL training. Interestingly, if a recruit played chess, his odds of becoming a SEAL increased threefold!¹¹⁹ Gallup identified the following as worthy of a SEAL profile.

- Traditional sports: water polo, triathlon, lacrosse, boxing, rugby, swimming, and wrestling
- Alternative sports: skiing, snowboarding, mountain biking, climbing, rappelling, martial arts
- Height: At least 5 feet 8 inches
- Weight: At least 162 pounds
- Age: 22 to 25
- Education: Bachelor's degree
- Hobbies: Hunting, woodworking, chess
- Geography: Grew up in New England (Vermont, New Hampshire, Maine, Massachusetts, Connecticut and Rhode Island), the Northern Plains (North and South Dakota, Minnesota, Nebraska, Iowa, Kansas and Missouri), or the West Coast (California, Washington and Oregon).¹²⁰

The SEALs have also developed a long-term engagement strategy for their recruitment efforts. They have forged a special relationship with high schools in the San Diego area and water polo players are invited to attend a SEAL fitness challenge. Here these young men run, swim, and perform push-ups under the mentorship of veteran SEALs.¹²¹ Each participant participates in a 500-yard swim, push-ups, sit-ups, pull-ups, and a 1.5-mile run. Fitness challenges occurred in Minneapolis, Boston, San Antonio, Los Angeles, Dearborn, and Chicago between 2006 and 2008.¹²² In addition, the SEALs hosted the "America's Finest City Tournament Men's High School Water Polo

¹¹⁹ Jeanette Steele, "Study Points SEAL Recruiters toward Athletes," *San Diego Union Tribune*, March 15, 2010, <http://www.signonsandiego.com/news/2010/mar/15/navys-seriously-sports/>.

¹²⁰ Ibid.

¹²¹ Ibid.

¹²² Dave Hecht, "Naval Special Warfare Center Recruiting Directorate," NSW Conference for America, October 18, 2007, <http://www.navy.mil/navco/cfa08/NSW%20Conf.%20for%20America%202.pdf>.

Invitational,” with 32 teams competing at four host sites in 2007. This tournament introduced 600 elite high school water polo players to the SEALs and attracted TV coverage on local NBC & Fox affiliates.¹²³

Gallup also recommended that the SEALs develop something with a “dog whistle” effect on teenage boys, with the SEALs sending out a “signal” that the right candidates would hear and respond.¹²⁴ The Gallup study found that engaging young men early was vital; age 15 was not too young to grab a boy’s attention, while a predictor of success during Hell Week was a longtime familiarity with the SEALs, ideally initiated before the age of 10. Consequently, Gallup suggested that the Navy find an agency specializing in child marketing to “establish awareness among young boys.”¹²⁵ The SEALs even developed their own extreme sporting event open to the public: the Super Frog Half Iron-Man, which is held on Coronado Island each September.¹²⁶ A half-hour long TV program about the triathlon airs on the local FOX TV station in San Diego, as well as on the Military Channel, and Footlocker produced a 90-second highlight video to air in 2,300 stores across the country starting in November 2007.¹²⁷

The SEALs even developed a Boy Scouts of America Navy SEAL Activity Badge Test given annually at scout fairs, jamborees, and at Navy Recruiting districts. To prepare the Boy Scouts for the event, the NSWRD produced a SEAL/Scout workout video.¹²⁸ Additionally, the NSWRD website, www.sealswcc.com, has been updated to provide potential candidates with accurate information about optimal physical preparation, nutrition, and the nature of a SEAL career. The website even provides a forum on which young men can discuss their preparations with each other and with NSWRD personnel.¹²⁹

¹²³ Hecht, “Naval Special Warfare Center Recruiting Directorate.”

¹²⁴ Steele, “Study Points SEAL Recruiters toward Athletes.”

¹²⁵ Ibid.

¹²⁶ Andrea Hsu, “Navy SEALs Seek to Build Up Their Ranks,” *National Public Radio*, April 9, 2007, <http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=9481756>.

¹²⁷ Hecht, “Naval Special Warfare Center Recruiting Directorate.”

¹²⁸ Ibid.

¹²⁹ NSW Center Public Affairs, “Growing the Force,” *Ethos* 8 (2010): 17.

F. DELTA FORCE¹³⁰

Terrorist incidents like the 1976 hijacking of the Air France airliner in Entebbe and the seizure of Israeli athletes in Munich helped convince a doubtful Pentagon of the importance of the United States standing up its own counter-terrorist force.¹³¹ Consequently, Special Forces Operational Detachment-Delta (SFOD-D), or Delta Force, was officially established on November 19, 1977, largely due to the efforts of Colonel Charlie Beckwith.¹³² COL Beckwith was a SF officer who had been randomly assigned in 1962 to serve in an exchange program with the British 22nd Special Air Service (SAS). His assignment with the SAS inspired him to form Delta Force.¹³³ Beckwith's experience with the small, elite British unit convinced him that the United States needed to create a counter-terrorist/hostage rescue capability. However, not until the Pentagon agreed could he begin finding the right men.

While assigned to the 22nd SAS Regiment, Beckwith commanded Three Troop of A Squadron. During this assignment, he was introduced to the informal yet extremely proficient SAS culture. He found that the SAS focused solely on "high quality and battle discipline," with little respect for drill or ceremonies. A graduate of the U.S. Army Ranger School, Beckwith struggled through the SAS land-navigation exercises over lengthy distances carrying a heavy rucksack and weapon from one rendezvous point (RV) to another. Minimal guidance was given and questions were not allowed; men would have to run most of the night during an exercise just to meet the unknown time standard. Failure was not tolerated well; if a soldier missed an RV, he remained at the RV without food. If a soldier became completely lost, he was forced to submerge all of his gear underwater and remain wet for the duration of the exercise.

¹³⁰ Due to the secrecy of Delta Force, only a limited number of open source references discuss the organization and its recruitment and selection process. These include Charlie A Beckwith and Donald Knox, *Delta Force* (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich Publishers, 1983); Pete Blaber, *The Mission, the Men, and Me* (New York: Berkley Caliber, 2008); Eric L. Haney, *Inside Delta Force* (New York: Bantam Dell, 2002).

¹³¹ Ian D. W. Sutherland, *Special Forces of the United States Army* (San Jose, CA: R. James Bender Publishing, 1990), 119.

¹³² Beckwith and Knox, *Delta Force*, 133.

¹³³ *Ibid.*, 12.

While serving with the 22nd SAS, Beckwith witnessed entire SAS selection courses that no one passed. If a man passed, his success signified he “enjoyed being alone, could think and operate by himself, and was strong-minded and resolute.”¹³⁴ Many men had to give up their current rank to join the SAS, only to work their way back up the promotion system.

As a Troop Commander, Beckwith participated in a combined exercise between the SAS and the French Berets Rouges in Corsica, which involved an escape and evasion exercise. He then deployed with his Troop to Malaya near the Thai-Malaya border, where the SAS had become famous for counter-insurgency operations years earlier. While recuperating from leptospirosis in a British hospital, Beckwith began to develop his plan to build an American version of the SAS, a force that could operate deep behind enemy lines in small teams and provide a strategic offensive role.

After his assignment with the SAS, and on his return to the United States, Beckwith commanded B-52 (DELTA Project), part of the 5th Special Forces Group in Vietnam from 1966–1967. He would later utilize both his SAS and Vietnam experiences to run the Special Forces School as its director in 1977, at the end of which, he was chosen to stand up his American SAS unit, Delta Force.¹³⁵ He had two years to find the right men and train them.

Beckwith sent his initial recruiters all over the U.S. Army to recruit willing, fit, and trainable men. He would eventually establish the following criteria for a potential recruit:

Perform well at their assigned MOS, in his second enlistment, no limiting physical profile, at least 22 years old and an American citizen, a GT score of 110, pass a background security check, pass a modified Special Forces Physical Training test and physical examination, be airborne or volunteer for airborne training, have no reoccurring disciplinary record, have two years of active service remaining, and pass the Delta Force selection course.¹³⁶

¹³⁴ Beckwith and Knox, *Delta Force*, 20.

¹³⁵ Sutherland, *Special Forces of the United States Army*, 65–66.

¹³⁶ Beckwith and Knox, *Delta Force*, 126.

The first selection course was modeled after Beckwith's SAS experience. Thirty combat-proven men from within the SF community were chosen for the first course to create a cadre for future Delta Force selection courses. This first course occurred in the Uwharrie National Forest near Troy, North Carolina. Seven men passed the first Delta Force selection course, which was later moved to Camp Dawson, West Virginia, where the terrain was more difficult and, thus, more similar to the SAS's Brecon Beacons. The second selection course graduated only five soldiers.¹³⁷

"Selection," as it became known, began with a Ranger/Special Forces PT test conducted in fatigues and combat boots with no breaks between events and graded at the 17-year-old scale. The events included push-ups, sit-ups, a running dodge-jump, an inverted crawl, and a two-mile run. An initial road march of 18 miles introduced the recruits to their next few weeks in West Virginia.¹³⁸

Detailed psychological evaluations, lasting four hours per recruit, closed out the first Selection course. Subsequent Selection courses used psychological written tests administered repeatedly throughout, with only minor wording changes between tests. By randomly repeating questions, the psychologists would be able to defeat duplicity or deception. Recruits were always given the tests when they were tired but never exhausted, presumably because it was easier to be truthful when tired since being truthful required much less energy. Even odd questions like "is your stool black and tarry?" had a purpose; it might indicate that a recruit has an ulcer or a drinking problem, since black and tarry stool is an indicator for blood in the digestive system.¹³⁹

Beckwith patterned the stress level in Selection after the 22nd SAS. All recruits performed individual, timed, land-navigation exercises in the challenging mountainous terrain of West Virginia. Recruits were given a prescribed load and instructed to move between RVs until an instructor informed them to remove their rucksacks.¹⁴⁰ The distances traveled increased daily from 10 km to 74 km and equipment weighed from 50

¹³⁷ Beckwith and Knox, *Delta Force*, 123–127.

¹³⁸ Haney, *Inside Delta Force*, 29–37.

¹³⁹ *Ibid.*, 42–43.

¹⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 48.

to 70 pounds. By the time recruits had made it to the 45-mile final event, they had reached a common level of exhaustion. This long journey revealed the men who had “determination, self-discipline, and self-sacrifice.”¹⁴¹ During the 45 miler, each recruit was given a RV point to move towards, but never knew the number of remaining RV points, the routes he would have to take, or whether he was traveling too slowly. After the 12th hour, a recruit usually found either a reason to quit or a way to meet the time requirement. The cadre running selection was very businesslike and never shouted at a recruit or offered encouragement. Cadre often repeated a common phrase throughout selection, like “have a good-un,” to help keep a recruit unaware of his performance.¹⁴²

Most recruits could already operate as members of a team before attending Selection, but Selection measured whether the recruits could operate as individuals. At any time, a recruit could voluntarily withdraw and he would receive no negative report in his record; he simply returned to his original unit. Recruits were competing against an unknown time standard, not each other, and fought to stay ahead of the “overdue time,” which could result in dismissal. If a candidate missed an RV point, he was dropped. The fear of failing and returning to his unit was a strong motivator for many.

Beckwith was looking for a particular type of man, one who was “inquisitive, sensitive, resourceful, and imaginative” and could easily transition between being extremely patient and extremely aggressive.¹⁴³ Additionally, each member had to be comfortable in both a heavily constrained and a highly unstable and complex environment where orders could be either specific or absent altogether. These requirements were often measured by ensuring that all instructions were written on a bulletin board, but were also very vague; furthermore, men were not restricted to the camp but were only required to follow the written instructions. Each member, thus, had to transition from being a leader to being a follower, in addition to enduring prolonged physical and mental activity or extended monotony.

¹⁴¹ Beckwith and Knox, *Delta Force*, 131.

¹⁴² Haney, *Inside Delta Force*, 30.

¹⁴³ Beckwith and Knox, *Delta Force*, 131.

III. UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE TALENT

Talent is defined by the specific attributes necessary for success and achievement in a particular activity. Superior talent is the principal means of preserving the competitive advantage in high performing organizations.¹⁴⁴ A talented violinist and a talented boxer share little in common concerning their particular professions. However, a talented policeman and firefighter may share overlapping abilities. Actively looking for men with traits necessary for effective UW, therefore, may lead a recruiter to search in populations beyond the normal sources of SF volunteers.

Talent is not simply a function of skill, perfection, experience, or physical characteristics, and in UW, talent often involves turning challenges into opportunity.¹⁴⁵ Organizational performance can be significantly increased based on talent alone. The effects of increasing talent can be easily measured in business. After three years of research studying the relationship between talent and performance inside 56 different companies (including 35 with over \$1 billion in revenue), Jeffrey Christian determined that talent proved decisive. The most talented performers were 50–100% more productive than their peers.¹⁴⁶ Talented people, thus, can make a significant difference, but they are often rare. The difference between high- and average-performing organizations is not better human resource processes, but rather the emphasis on talent.¹⁴⁷

Talent on the unconventional warfare battlefield is multidimensional and more challenging than the profit-driven bottom line of the business world. Motivating and leading other men to resist and overthrow the members of their state or the occupying power is extremely difficult. Measuring the capacity for success under these

¹⁴⁴ Jean-Marie Hiltrop, “The Quest for the Best: Human Resource Practices to Attract and Retain Talent,” *European Management Journal* 17, no. 4 (1999): 422.

¹⁴⁵ This was a common theme in Dr. Anna Simons’ Fall 2010 Military Advisor course at the Naval Postgraduate School. The theme is also reinforced in Jeffrey E. Christian’s *Headhunter’s Edge* (New York: Random House, Inc., 2002) where he describes that the most talented people often get thrown into the worst situations and repeatedly turn things around; see page 84.

¹⁴⁶ Christian, *Headhunter’s Edge*, 11.

¹⁴⁷ Ed Michaels, Helen Handfield-Jones, and Beth Axelrod, *The War for Talent* (Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 2001), 6.

circumstances may be more challenging still. Even with all of the mobilization resources in the United States during WWII, the OSS Assessment Staff quickly realized how difficult it is to predict accurately human behavior in a combat environment. A Burmese-speaking individual with exceptional knowledge of the Burmese culture may become craven once he is deployed in the remote jungles to live and fight with guerrillas. Likewise, a daring combat-proven veteran with expertise in small unit tactics may despise working with the very guerrillas that he is charged with advising, which leads to an irreparable loss of rapport for him and future advisors. Unconventional warfare has historically been an exceedingly unpredictable form of warfare and lacks a detailed prescriptive for success. In Chapter II, however, the review of extremely successful UW units suggests a combination of motivation, interpersonal intelligence, cross-cultural capability, and adaptability produced some of the most talented UW warriors (Figure 2).¹⁴⁸




Figure 2. UW-Talent Model

¹⁴⁸ Several informal discussions conducted by the author with mid-level officers within the U.S. Army SF and U.S. Navy SEALs also indicated that motivation, interpersonal intelligence, cross-cultural capability, and adaptability were traits most important held by operators, both officer and NCO, which are considered to be the “most talented” for UW.

A. MOTIVATION

Motivation may be *the* single most important trait in an individual selected for UW operations. When the OSS Assessment Staff analyzed motivation in potential recruits, they looked at a candidate's desire to accomplish goals and the energy and initiative displayed in pursuit of these goals in the OSS. Motivation for assignment was considered a prerequisite by many and was used as a condition in screening potential recruits.¹⁴⁹ As in other UW organizations, SACO volunteers could quit at any time. Since they were expected to live, eat, and fight as Chinese, any lack of motivation overseas could prove disastrous. The Coastwatchers were all civilian volunteers who chose to fight and survive in the island terrain. Without the drive to fight and survive, the Coastwatchers' abilities to influence the locals and provide intelligence on the Japanese would have been unsuccessful, with potentially disastrous effects. Delta Force and the SAS relied on solitary long-distance military orienteering to test the motivation of each recruit. The Navy SEALs conduct similar evaluations using extended swimming in cold water to measure a recruit's internal motivation. In case after case, it becomes clear that UW organizations must have men with unquestioned motivation.

B. INTERPERSONAL INTELLIGENCE

Throughout Unconventional Warfare history, interpersonal intelligence has been essential.¹⁵⁰ The ability to work with other people, often from a different race and culture, has been a significant factor in success. For instance, in the realm of advising, host-nation commanders "believed that mutual trust and respect, as well as an open, honest willingness to work together, were more important traits for an adviser than military competence ... to be effective, advisers needed interpersonal and intercultural skills more than military skills."¹⁵¹ Rapport is never permanent and can easily be

¹⁴⁹ Office of Strategic Services, *Assessment of Men*, 233–236.

¹⁵⁰ Several informal discussions among Army SF officers attending the Naval Postgraduate School from 2010–2011 revealed that they considered interpersonal intelligence to often be the most important trait of an effective unconventional warrior, not physical fitness or marksmanship.

¹⁵¹ Robert D. Ramsey III, "Some Observations on Americans Advising Indigenous Forces," in *The U.S. Army and Irregular Warfare, 1775–2007: Selected Papers from the 2007 Conference of Army Historians*, ed. Richard G. Davis (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, 2008), 246–247.

damaged by misunderstandings compounded by language, cultural, personal, or institutional differences, in addition to honest disagreements.¹⁵²

Howard Gardner describes several forms of intelligence in *Frames of Mind*, including linguistic, musical, logic-math, spatial, body coordination, intrapersonal, and interpersonal. Personal intelligence links two forms of intelligence together, *intrapersonal* intelligence and *interpersonal* intelligence. Intrapersonal intelligence describes the ability for an individual to read and assess his own feelings, while interpersonal intelligence allows him to notice and differentiate among other people's moods, motivations, and intentions.¹⁵³ Interpersonal intelligence is particularly important to UW because if one understands the feelings, responses, and behavior of the partisan force he is working by, with, and through, he will be more likely to interact appropriately with them and secure his proper place within the larger community.¹⁵⁴

Common sense is another form of interpersonal intelligence and is the ability to “deal with problems in an intuitive, rapid and accurate manner.”¹⁵⁵ Ironically, it appears to be mislabeled as “common” and much less easily measurable. Common sense is the capacity to bring together a vast amount of information and make it part of a general and effective plan of action. Interpersonal intelligence also encompasses Malcolm Gladwell's practical intelligence, which is different from other cognitive abilities and provides the knowledge that helps one read a situation and say the right thing at the right time. It is procedural—knowing how to do something, without necessarily knowing why.¹⁵⁶

While recruiting men for SACO, Miles was most concerned with maintaining cooperation and rapport, for interpersonal intelligence figured significantly into that ability. The Coastwatchers had to remain socially vigilant because they were always under the risk of treachery by a hired native. The British SAS similarly relied heavily on

¹⁵² Ramsey, “Some Observations on Americans Advising Indigenous Forces,” 246.

¹⁵³ Howard Gardner, *Frames of Mind* (New York: Basic Books, 1983), 239.

¹⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, 254.

¹⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, 287.

¹⁵⁶ Malcolm Gladwell, *Outliers: the Story of Success* (New York: Little Brown and Company, 2008), 101.

rapport built with natives in Malaya during the 1950s and again in Borneo during the 1960s. Support from these local tribes built an intelligence network that helped locate the enemy; in Malaya the phrase, “hearts and minds” was coined.¹⁵⁷ Reading tense social situations and motivations was necessary for survival, as well as for maintaining the support network in the jungle. Finally, the OSS became aware of failures in the field due to lack of interpersonal intelligence. The following memorandum from early 1943, before the Assessment Staff began work, illustrates the problems the OSS experienced by recruiting men lacking in interpersonal intelligence. According to the report:

The organization has been recruiting too many men, civilian or military, who have intelligence and sometimes the necessary mechanical training but who lack common sense, know nothing about working with men or how to look after the welfare and the morale of men under them. We simply must have men who can shoulder responsibility and use initiative with common sense. Simply because a man has intelligence does not qualify him for this type of work. In some instances, we have men who fall into the class of the high-strung or emotional type. We simply cannot use men of that type in the field when they have to live with Chinese, eat Chinese food, and be under pressure at times.¹⁵⁸

C. CROSS-CULTURAL CAPABILITY

Intertwined with interpersonal intelligence is cross-cultural capability. While not unique to UW, understanding and working within the culture of the local force is vital in all UW operations. The desire to learn the ethnography of the guerrilla force and to work within its framework can mean the difference between success and failure. Thus, finding men who are comfortable working truly “by, with, and through” often means selecting men previously exposed to other cultures or finding those who just enjoy interacting with

¹⁵⁷ Geraghty, *Inside the S.A.S.*, 3.

¹⁵⁸ Office of Strategic Services, *Assessment of Men*, 13.

different people. Combining models of language proficiency and regional-specific knowledge with cultural intelligence produces an overarching model of cultural capability (Figure 3).¹⁵⁹




Figure 3. Cross-Cultural Capability Components

While language proficiency is a product of education and regional-specific knowledge represents a combination of education and travel experience, cultural intelligence refers to the correct interpretation of unfamiliar verbal and nonverbal cues in different cultural circumstances. Culturally intelligent individuals:

Exhibit impression awareness, that is, knowledge that provides a basis for people to know how others form impressions and an ability to predict them, possess knowledge of cultural differences, that is, anticipate cause-effect social relationships and social rules across cultures, and have the ability to successfully translate intentions to perform and produce a particular behavior.¹⁶⁰

¹⁵⁹ For “language proficiency” and “regional specific knowledge” see Allison Abbe, “Transfer and Generalizability of Foreign Language Learning,” U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences Study Report 2008–06, February 2009, 2; For “cultural intelligence” see Detelin S. Elenkov and Joana R. C. Pimentel, “Social Intelligence, Emotional Intelligence, and Cultural Intelligence: An Integrative Perspective” in *Handbook of Cultural Intelligence: Theory, Measurement, and Applications*, ed. Soon Ang and Linn Van Dyne (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 2008), 289–306.

¹⁶⁰ Lenkov and Pimentel, “Social Intelligence, Emotional Intelligence, and Cultural Intelligence: An Integrative Perspective,” 296–297.

Knowing how natives form impressions is dependent upon the understanding that individuals from different cultures have different experiences from the individual and from the larger group. For example, Eastern cultures typically view the “self” as a product of established community relationships, whereas Westerners tend to “value independence, self-reliance, and focus on individual growth.”¹⁶¹ Among those familiar with these kinds of differences are missionaries, but even proselytizing has begun to change. Instead of living abroad for long periods, short-term missions have become more common.¹⁶² Most of today’s missionaries travel into other countries for only a limited time unlike earlier missionaries that spent a lifetime in a foreign country. The result of short-term missionary work is a failure to gain regional specific knowledge about other cultures. The category width of these short-term missionaries produces narrow categorizers who place most issues into categories of right versus wrong with a very small category for things that were simply different (Figure 4). However, longer exposure to other cultures may allow an individual to become a wider categorizer who lengthens the category of different while still maintaining personal feelings of right versus wrong (Figure 4).¹⁶³




Figure 4. Category Width¹⁶⁴

¹⁶¹ Lenkov and Pimentel, “Social Intelligence, Emotional Intelligence, and Cultural Intelligence: An Integrative Perspective,” 297.

¹⁶² David Livermore, “Cultural Intelligence and Short-Term Missions: the Phenomenon of the Fifteen-year-old Missionary,” in *Handbook of Cultural Intelligence: Theory, Measurement, and Applications*, edited by Soon Ang and Linn Van Dyne (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 2008), 271–288.

¹⁶³ Ibid., 278.

¹⁶⁴ See R. Detwiler, “Culture, Category Width, and Attributions,” *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology* 9 (1978) 259–284; T. F. Pettigrew, “The Measurement and Correlates of Category Width as a Cognitive Variable,” *Journal of Personality* 26 (1958): 532–44.

Language proficiency is another important component for UW operations. A Coastwatcher had to learn the local pidgin, which could take up to a year. OSS Jedburgh members in Nazi occupied France had to speak French fluently to coordinate guerrilla activities. Likewise, the SAS needed language proficiency during operations in Southeast Asia and in Oman in 1972 to defeat communist guerrillas in the southern mountains of Dhofar.¹⁶⁵

Perhaps nowhere was the lack of language proficiency more detrimental than many of the key personnel in the Department of State during the Cold War. Several ambassadors were unable to speak the native languages of their assigned country, including ambassadors assigned to France, Italy, Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, Norway, and Turkey. Since these representatives are actually more than figureheads and serve as leaders of our diplomatic corps in a given country, poor understanding can produce bad results.¹⁶⁶

D. ADAPTABILITY

The unpredictability of conflict, especially in UW, demands flexible, adaptive personnel and organizations. In fact, successful UW units by definition are adaptable. Adaptability involves a “functional change in response to actual or correctly anticipated alterations in environmental contingencies.”¹⁶⁷ Beyond just being capable of adapting, UW soldiers must be able to thrive in a complex and unstable environment. The OSS Assessment staff measured for adaptability, and the SAS and Delta Force selection processes assessed a recruit’s ability to adapt to ambiguous situations, such as unknown standards for performance.

¹⁶⁵ Geraghty, *Inside the S.A.S.*, 131.

¹⁶⁶ Willian J. Lederer and Eugene Burdick, *The Ugly American* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1958), 273.

¹⁶⁷ Stephen J. Zaccaro, Deanna Banks, Lee Kiechel-Koles, Cary Kemp, and Paige Bader, “Leader and Team Adaptation: The Influence and Development of Key Attributes and Processes,” U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences, Technical Report 1256, August 2009.

E. ASSESSING UW-TALENT

If each organization described in Chapter II was analyzed using ordinal measurements for the qualitative components for UW talent—motivation, interpersonal intelligence, cross-cultural capability, and adaptability—the results are as follows: the OSS, SACO, and Coastwatchers scored higher for interpersonal intelligence and cross-cultural capability, whereas the Navy SEALs and Delta Force scored higher for motivation and adaptability. The SAS ranges between these two units (Table 1).

Table 1. UW Talent Across Different Organizations

Component	OSS	SACO	Coastwatchers	SAS	Navy SEALs	Delta Force
Motivation	4	3	4	1	1	1
Interpersonal Intelligence	1	2	2	4	3	3
Cross-Cultural Capability	2	1	1	2	4	4
Adaptability	3	4	3	3	2	2

As with any model, issues arise with simplifying what constitutes talent in each of these organizations. None of these organizations has (or had) the identical mission, and the OSS, SACO, and Coastwatchers no longer exist; while their histories are available, current details on SAS and Delta Force are restricted to only a handful of published books. Additionally, all four components for UW talent are interrelated. The following have been determined: the more UW focused units (e.g. OSS, SACO, Coastwatchers) tend to value interpersonal intelligence and cross-cultural capability; UW-like or UW-DA hybrid organizations, (e.g., SAS, Navy SEALs, Delta Force) tend to prize motivation and adaptability, probably considering cross-cultural capability less important.

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IV. SPECIAL FORCES RECRUITMENT

The process of recruitment and selection of personnel in any organization that operates in challenging environments has two primary goals, to select out (selection) and in (recruitment). Selecting out minimizes the risks of selecting personnel unfit for the unit, while selecting in identifies applicants especially suited for high performance in the task environment. Recruitment is a “positive” action through which candidates are found for possible employment, while selection serving as the “negative” complement by screening recruits for those most likely to succeed.¹⁶⁸ In reality, it is difficult to separate recruitment and selection, since some selectivity must be exercised in any recruitment.¹⁶⁹

I volunteer for Special Forces training and duty. I further volunteer to perform frequent aircraft flights, glider flights, parachute jumps, and participate in realistic combat training while receiving airborne and/or Special Forces training and performing Special Forces duty.¹⁷⁰

The above passage was taken from the first SF application in 1952. Recruits submitted their application and were chosen based on their paper record, unless they knew current SF members. Former soldiers with WWII SOF or Ranger experience were targeted for recruitment, but more men were needed. Therefore, new recruits were added. They were expected to be at least 21, physically fit, psychological sound (they had to pass a test), and they had to already be, or willing to be, qualified parachutists. These men were usually required to be qualified as infantryman, radio operators, medics, or demolitions experts.¹⁷¹ Many of the experienced soldiers had language skills from previous service in the OSS. In 1952, however, just being a qualified parachutist nearly

¹⁶⁸ Iain Grant, Hege R. Eriksen, Peter Marquis, Ingrid J. Orre, Lawrence A. Palinkas, Peter Suedfeld, Erling Svensen, and Holger Ursin, “Psychological Selection of Antarctic Personnel: The “SOAP” Instrument,” *Aviation, Space, and Environmental Medicine* 78, no. 8 (2007): 799.

¹⁶⁹ Harold C. Stone and William E. Kendall, *Effective Personnel Selection Procedures* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1956), 20.

¹⁷⁰ This was the first paragraph of the required letter for application to SF from April 25, 1952; see Sutherland, *Special Forces of the United States Army*, 120.

¹⁷¹ Michael McClintock, “Toward a Doctrine of Special Warfare—Cold War and Covert Action: From OSS to CIA,” *Instruments of Statecraft: U.S. Guerilla Warfare, Counterinsurgency, and Counterterrorism, 1940–1990*, 2002, <http://www.statecraft.org/chapter2.html>.

guaranteed selection into SF.¹⁷² At the time, no single recruiting organization was dedicated to find men for SF. In addition, no selection and assessment process existed to screen out unsuitable recruits. Men with proven combat experience were sometimes assigned to the same units as those with no experience. Even the future Delta Force founder, COL Beckwith, was *issued* his green beret but was not forced to earn it.¹⁷³ The recruitment and selection situation eventually changed with the establishment of the Special Forces Assessment and Selection (SFAS) program in the summer of 1988 and its subsequent recruiting component, the Special Operations Recruiting Company (SORC).¹⁷⁴

SF soldiers must be mature, capable of working well with different types of people, and adept at understanding the cultural dynamics of a particular location to identify exploitable opportunities. At the same time, they needed to operate with minimal guidance. Whereas the OSS had over 3 million conscripts from which to screen, the nature of the all-volunteer force of today presents challenges for finding qualified men, let alone the most talented men for SF. The aspiration to attend college has cut the number of men interested in the Army.¹⁷⁵ This trend has been building for decades. More surprising is that only 1.9 million out of the country's 30.8 million 17–24 year olds are even qualified to join the Army.¹⁷⁶ By comparison, roughly three out of four young men qualified for service in the U.S. Army in fiscal year 1981.¹⁷⁷

The U.S. Army Special Forces Regiment is a male-only, triple volunteer organization. A potential recruit must first volunteer for the U.S. Army, then volunteer to complete airborne training, and finally, volunteer to attend SF training. There are four

¹⁷² Sutherland, *Special Forces of the United States Army*, 131.

¹⁷³ Beckwith and Knox, *Delta Force*, 18.

¹⁷⁴ The SORC would later become a battalion and renamed the SORB in 2006.

¹⁷⁵ Donald Vandergriff, *Manning the Future Legions of the United States* (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2008), 115.

¹⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, 116. This number includes for both men and women and most are unable to serve due to physical, psychological, educational, or legal disqualifications.

¹⁷⁷ Eitelberg et al., *Screening for Service: Aptitude and Education Criteria for Military Entry*, 79.

primary paths by which male volunteers can join Special Forces (Figure 5).¹⁷⁸ First, potential candidates can join the active duty U.S. Army. After an initial Army assignment and after earning the rank of Specialist (or First Lieutenant promotable for officers), they can then volunteer to attend Special Forces Assessment and Selection (SFAS). SFAS has varied in length over the years, but remains an extremely physically challenging course with more than half of all volunteers failing.¹⁷⁹ If a volunteer successfully completes SFAS, he must then finish all of the required AF training that can take from one to two years, depending on his military occupational specialty (MOS).¹⁸⁰

The second method of joining SF is for citizens with no previous military experience to enlist for a Special Forces Candidate contract in the 18X program at a regular Army recruiting station. The 18X program (pronounced 18-Xray) was originally established in 1990 to authorize qualified prior service soldiers who had separated from any of the armed services to become eligible to reenlist into SF pending successful completion of SFAS. The 18X program was reintroduced in 2002 for qualified male citizens with no previous military experience to apply for SF after completing basic training, advanced infantry training, and airborne school.

Alternatively, a volunteer can enlist in the National Guard and then join a National Guard Special Forces Company, contingent upon completing SFAS. Eighty-four

¹⁷⁸ For a description of the process involved in volunteering for SFAS and completing SF training, see Dick Couch, *Chosen Soldier* (New York: Crown Publishers, 2007).

¹⁷⁹ In 2008, the SFAS course was altered from 24 days to 14 days to allow more SFAS classes per year. Consequently, the success rate was dramatically reduced and injuries increased. It was subsequently bumped back to 19 days in 2009.

¹⁸⁰ SF has eight MOS positions: 18A–Officer, 180A–Warrant Officer, 18B–Weapons Sergeant, 18C–Engineer Sergeant, 18D–Medical Sergeant, 18E–Communications Sergeant, 18F–Intelligence Sergeant, 18Z–Senior NCO. Only five are open to new SF recruits: 18A, 18B, 18C, 18D, 18E.

percent (8,425 men) of today's Special Forces Regiment is on active duty.¹⁸¹ The remaining 16% (1,627 men) serve in the Army National Guard, who are dispersed throughout the continental United States as SF companies.¹⁸²




Figure 5. Different mechanisms exist for attending SFAS although active duty recruitment by the SORB and the 18X program is by far the most significant.

¹⁸¹ Data provided to the author by the Defense Manpower Data Center located in Fort Ord, CA in March 2011.

¹⁸² 19th SFG(A) and 20th SFG(A) are the two National Guard Special Forces units and have the following units and locations: A/1/20th SFG(A) in Auburn, AL; HQ/20th SFG(A) in Birmingham, AL; B/1/20th SFG(A) in Mobile, AL; HQ/1/20th SFG(A) in Huntsville, AL; HQ/2/20th SFG(A) in Jackson, MS; C/2/20th SFG(A) in Grenada, MS; A/2/20th SFG(A) in Chicago, IL; B/2/20th SFG(A) in Glen Arm, MD; B/3/20th SFG(A) in Roanoke Rapids, NC; C/1/20th SFG(A) in Springfield, MA; A/3/20th SFG(A) in Ocala, FL; C/3/20th SFG(A) in Wauchula, FL; HQ/19th SFG(A) in Draper, UT; HQ/1/19th SFG(A) in Riverton, UT; A/5/19th SFG(A) in Los Alamitos, CA; A/1/19th SFG(A) in Buckley, WA; B/5/19th SFG(A) in Fort Carson, CO; HQ/5/19th SFG(A) in Watkins, CO; C/5/19th SFG(A) in San Antonio, TX; B/2/19th SFG(A) in Columbus, OH; HQ/2/19th SFG(A) in Kenova, WV; C/2/19th SFG(A) in Kingwood, WV; A/2/19th SFG(A) in Middletown, RI; C/1/19th SFG(A) in San Antonio, TX; units and location listed at <http://www.nationalguard.com/careers/special-forces/special-forces-unit-finder>.

Finally, a limited avenue is available for non-Army military volunteers. Service members in other military branches may transfer into the Army and attend SFAS. For example, a limited number of active duty is Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps officers authorized to complete a branch transfer into SF, but this move requires an extensive approval process before the officer can be admitted to attend SFAS.¹⁸³

Legal non-citizens can join the Army under the Military Accessions to National Interest (MAVNI) program.¹⁸⁴ While not a special pathway directly into SF, MAVNI opens up a potentially critical market for native foreign language speakers. MAVNI volunteers can volunteer for SF either through an 18X contract when they join or after meeting the prerequisites for all active duty Army soldiers.

Today, the main criteria for screening potential SF enlisted candidates are the same requirements used for all potential Army recruits, education and aptitude. All SF volunteers must be high school graduates with a GED, with a diploma, or with some higher education. Aptitude is evaluated using scores from the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB), which covers nine different multiple-choice topics. The General Technical, or GT, score from the ASVAB serves as a screen.¹⁸⁵ The minimum GT score for SF was increased from 100 to 107 in 2009.¹⁸⁶ A limited number of waivers are available for recruits scoring between 100 and 107. Any soldier who scores below

¹⁸³ The U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences found that prior service Air Force and Navy volunteers previously separated from the military performed well at SFAS; see Elizabeth J. Brady and Judith E. Brooks from the U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences and their published Research Report 1646 in October of 1993 entitled “Prior Service Soldiers in the Special Forces Assessment and Selection Program: Recruitment Issues.”

¹⁸⁴ MAVNI information can be found at <http://www.defense.gov/news/mavni-fact-sheet.pdf>.

¹⁸⁵ The GT score is composed of two components, the Verbal Expression (VE) and Arithmetic Reasoning (AR). The verbal expression is a combination of two different components tests, the Paragraph Comprehension (PC) and Word Knowledge (WK) sections. The WK measures one’s ability to select the correct meaning of a word presented in context and to identify the best synonym for a given word. The PC measures the recruit’s ability to obtain information from written passages. These two tests are combined with the Arithmetic Reasoning (AR) to form a complete GT score. The AR measures the ability to solve arithmetic word problems; for more info, see http://www.official-asvab.com/docs/asvab_fact_sheet.pdf.

¹⁸⁶ When the GT score was changed from 100 to 107, several SORB recruiters approached the leadership within some of the active duty SF groups to show them which current operators would no longer qualify to try out for SF. As it turns out, many highly respected and proven operators fell into this category.

107 can voluntarily attend a GT score improvement program, which usually increases a soldier's GT score.¹⁸⁷ Beyond needing the minimum GT score, a minimum score of 240 is required on the Army Physical Fitness Test (APFT).

A. RECRUITERS

Active duty SF recruitment is conducted by two different organizations within the U.S. Army Recruiting Command (USAREC). USAREC is interested and, in fact, evaluated on its ability to recruit a specified *quantity* of qualified personnel. Considering that it is the sole manpower generator for an all-volunteer Army exceeding 550,000 active duty soldiers, this is a logical mission. In contrast, the SF are more concerned with the *quality* of any potential recruits. A cursory glance at four of the five SOF truths, axioms routinely posted in any SOF headquarters, reveals a significant focus on the individual:

- Humans are more important than hardware
- *Quality is better than quantity*
- Special Operations Forces cannot be mass produced
- Competent Special Operations Forces cannot be created after emergencies occur¹⁸⁸

Ironically, only two organizations can recruit men to try out for SF, and neither works for USASOC or SOCOM. The first recruiting unit is the Special Operations Recruiting Battalion (SORB), which recruits all active duty soldiers for attendance at SFAS. In reality, the SORB recruits nearly all of the active duty Army SOF, including SF, Civil Affairs, Psychological Operations, and the Special Operations Aviation Regiment (SOAR).¹⁸⁹ These recruiters are responsible for providing the largest amount of personnel who attend SFAS each year. The second organization that recruits for SF is the Army's normal recruiting brigades.

¹⁸⁷ Each Army post runs a Basic Skills Education Program (BSEP), while other completely online websites exist to help improve GT scores for interested soldiers, see www.march2success.com.

¹⁸⁸ SOF truths found on the official USASOC webpage; see <http://www.soc.mil/USASOC%20Headquarters/SOF%20Truths.html>.

¹⁸⁹ Although not part of Army SOF, the SORB also recruits for Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD). In addition, it was charged in late 2009 with recruiting for all Army Warrant Officers, another non-SOF recruiting mission. Surprisingly, the SORB does not recruit for Ranger Regiment.

1. The Special Operations Recruiting Battalion (SORB)

Headquartered at Fort Bragg, NC, the SORB is distributed into several small recruiting teams across the continental United States, with additional teams in Hawaii and Germany. Most of these recruiting teams consist of three recruiters, usually with one qualified 18-series NCO recruiter. The teams are controlled by regionally aligned recruiting companies, which are commanded by SF officers. While most of the recruiters in the SORB are not SF qualified, the SORB is selective about which recruiters can join it; new recruiters are required to attend a challenging orientation program advised by SFAS cadre to help them understand what recruits will experience at SFAS. The non-SF qualified recruiters in the SORB are considered some of the best recruiters within USAREC. However, the SORB is authorized only a limited number of SF qualified NCOs and officers, which, in turn, limits the number of interactions between interested recruits and SF qualified recruiters.

The leadership of each Special Forces Group must approve a SF qualified recruiter before the SORB interviews that individual. Historically, many of the SF NCOs assigned to the SORB were injured, operationally fatigued, or had family issues that made them excellent candidates for assignment. While these issues sometimes led to less fitting SF NCOs ending up at the SORB, recent efforts by the SORB have made recruiting assignments more selective. Still, most members in the SF community do not view assignment to recruiting duty as a high priority, not even when it is for recruitment for SF.

A SORB recruiter has two jobs, recruit soldiers who will volunteer for SFAS, and facilitate their attendance. Recruiters routinely interact with company, battalion, and brigade level leadership to contact all eligible soldiers about joining SF. In addition, the SORB battalion leadership regularly interfaces at higher command levels, such as with the Eighth U.S. Army (EUSA) in Korea. SORB recruiters habitually visit individual units and high traffic areas (PXs and gyms), while constantly e-mailing eligible soldiers about opportunities within SF. In addition, the SORB conducts SOF career fairs at different Army installations after units redeploy, including at OCONUS locations.

The driving force behind the SORB, as with all USAREC controlled units, is its recruiting mission, namely, the number of active duty enlisted soldiers it must recruit for attendance to SFAS. This recruitment represents a joint agreement between USAREC and the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School (USAJFKSWCS), which is the entity that conducts SFAS. Recent SORB annual missions have required at or near 2,000 active duty enlisted soldiers to attend SFAS. Meanwhile, interested officers submit their file through the SORB to an annual board that selects officers for attendance to SFAS. Before they even attend SFAS in 2011, nearly 600 officers competed for only about 300 officer slots at SFAS.¹⁹⁰ Thus, unlike enlisted soldiers, officer candidates are selected “in” before they even attend SFAS.

2. Non-Prior Service (NPS) Recruiters

Interested civilians can join SF by contacting an Army recruiter at an Army recruiting station. Army recruiters enlist non-prior service (NPS) civilians for service in the Army.¹⁹¹ USAREC has seven recruiting brigades consisting of 9,500 soldiers distributed globally across 1,400 recruiting stations. The individual recruiting stations are the first step for an interested civilian to try out for SF. These recruiters enlist interested male civilians if they meet the following criteria from Army Regulation 614-100:

- 20–29 years old by departure date for Infantry One Station Unit Training (OSUT)¹⁹²
- Qualified and volunteer for airborne training
- U.S. citizen
- Min ASVAB scores of 107 general technical (GT) and 98 combat operation (CO)
- High School Diploma
- Eligible for a SECRET clearance
- Medically qualified for Special Forces training

¹⁹⁰ Estimated FY2011 Army Special Operations Forces (ARSOF) Selection Board, which selects officers for training in Special Forces, Civil Affairs, or PSYOPs.

¹⁹¹ NPS, or Non-Prior Service, is Army recruiting lexicon for civilians with no previous military experience.

¹⁹² Infantry One Station Unit Training (OSUT) is a combination of Basic Combat Training and Advanced Individual Training (AIT) for infantry, followed by airborne school.

- Complete the Defense Language Aptitude Battery (DLAB) with a minimum score of 70 or a Defense Language Proficiency Test (DLPT) with a minimum of 1/1 reading and listening score
- Achieve an APFT score of 240 with a minimum of 60 points in each event using the standards for age group 17–21.

B. RECRUITMENT PROCESS

To modify one of Clausewitz's famous aphorisms, attending SFAS is simple, but the simplest thing is difficult. Active-duty soldiers often face retribution from their leadership just for contacting a SF recruiter.¹⁹³ Once a soldier decides to try out for SF, the process involves attending a standard SF briefing, completing an administrative packet, receiving a physical examination, and completing an Army physical fitness test administered by a SORB recruiter. Once his packet is complete, the volunteer coordinates for an available SFAS class to attend. Once approved, the candidate receives orders and flies to Fort Bragg for his SFAS class.

In contrast, 18X candidates must successfully complete infantry OSUT and airborne training. Next, he attends the Special Operations Preparatory & Conditioning (SOPC) course at Fort Bragg, NC. SOPC provides these relatively new recruits with basic soldiering skills and begins to inculcate the institutional culture of the Army and SF. Excluding their basic training and airborne school, recruits in the 18X program often lack any familiarity with the military and the SOPC course is designed to prepare them to complete SFAS successfully. It lasts two weeks and consists of physical conditioning, land navigation, and small unit team building. Once soldiers complete SOPC, they are then scheduled for SFAS.

¹⁹³ The author observed this issue as a SF recruiting company commander for 18 months. Often, the officers and senior NCOs in the chain of command of an interested candidate would make it difficult for a volunteer to train or attend SFAS or they would threaten extreme, but legal, treatment if the volunteer failed SFAS and returned to the unit. This retribution sometimes served as motivation to not quit and perform well during SFAS. It is also important to note many commands were supportive. Ultimately, the unsupportive reactions by some commands towards interested candidates were usually the result of personal feelings by the leadership towards the Special Forces Regiment overall and not indicative of any specific organization.

C. SPECIAL FORCES ASSESSMENT AND SELECTION (SFAS)

During the infancy of SF, to earn SF qualification, it was only necessary to complete a training course along with a specified number of UW exercises and service in an operational unit; many soldiers were simply assigned to a SF unit.¹⁹⁴ While the Special Forces Qualification Course (SFQC) was developed to teach candidates the required skills for conducting UW missions, no selection process existed to access volunteers, which changed in June 1988 when the first Special Forces Orientation and Training (SFOT) class was conducted at Camp Mackall, NC. This class was based largely on the British SAS selection process, which actually was not institutionalized until the 1950s. SFOT's genesis began in the mid-1980s when BG James Guest and COL Richard Potter concluded that SF needed a selection process. COL Potter persuaded the Army staff to approve SFOT by highlighting the savings and combat readiness associated with a dedicated selection and assessment program. Using research data about desirable traits in a SF soldier along with insights from individuals who had previously attended the Australian SAS selection course, SFOT took 14 months to coordinate. After consulting with several other SOF organizations, including the British SAS, SFOT earned validation in the spring of 1988. For the first year, SFOT ran nine classes with approximately 190 volunteers each. In June 1989, the name SFOT changed to Special Forces Assessment and Selection (SFAS).¹⁹⁵

While SFAS varied in its events, their sequence, and the duration of the course (between 14–24 days), its purpose has remained relatively unchanged. By evaluating specific attributes considered universally essential for SF soldiers (intelligence, trainability, physical fitness, motivation, influence, and judgment), SFAS selects candidates that it believes will be able to complete the SFQC. All candidates undergo different forms of physical and mental stress. Candidates endure a variety of assessments, including an Army APFT, obstacle courses, log drills, rifle PT, long distance runs, ruckmarches, military orienteering, Minnesota Multifacet Personality Inventory (MMPI),

¹⁹⁴ Sutherland, *Special Forces of the United States Army*, 131.

¹⁹⁵ Most of the history of SFAS was taken from an article written by James L. Velky who was one of the project officers for the establishment of SFAS; see "Special Forces Assessment and Selection," *Special Warfare* 3, no. 1 (1990): 12–15, <http://www.soc.mil/swcs/swmag/90win.pdf>.

the Wonderlic Personnel Intelligence Test (WPIT), and the 16 Personality Factor Test (16PF).¹⁹⁶ SFAS assesses each candidate through behavioral observation and performance measures. All assessments are performed in a neutral environment with limited information offered, no performance feedback, and minimal harassment. Upon successful completion of SFAS, a soldier is considered “selected” and is scheduled to return to Fort Bragg and attend the SFQC (and airborne school if needed).

D. TODAY’S ACTIVE-DUTY SFAS CANDIDATE¹⁹⁷

Although no duty restrictions within the Army exist for qualified male soldiers,¹⁹⁸ SF often attracts combat arms soldiers disproportionately.¹⁹⁹ This fact is clearly illustrated by the success rates of combat arms and noncombat arms candidates in SFAS. Between 1995 and 2009, 24,969 active duty enlisted men volunteered for SFAS; 54% (13,716) came from combat arms branches. Overall, only 8,888 men successfully completed SFAS. Combat arms soldiers had a 41.6% success rate while non-combat arms had a 28.2% success rate (Figure 6).

¹⁹⁶ USAREC Pamphlet 601-25 14 NOV 06.

¹⁹⁷ All data used for SFAS candidate analysis were SORB data available to the author while he served as Commander, C Co, Special Operations Recruiting Battalion (SORB) from 2008–2009.

¹⁹⁸ Current qualifications for active-duty enlisted men to attend SFAS include rank between E–4 and E–7, GT score of 107, APFT score of 240 or greater, pass a SF physical exam, be eligible for a secret clearance, be a U.S. citizen, volunteer for airborne training, and have no serious administrative punishments in his record. For active-duty officers, they must have a rank of First Lieutenant or Captain, DLAB score of 85 or higher, APFT score of 240 or greater, pass a SF physical exam, have a secret clearance, be a U.S. citizen, and volunteer for airborne training.

¹⁹⁹ For official definitions of combat arms, combat support, and combat service support, see Army Regulation 600–82, “The U.S. Army Regimental System,” June 5, 1990; Combat Arms included the Army branches of Infantry, Armor, Cavalry, Field Artillery, Engineer, Aviation, Air Defense Artillery, and Special Forces. In 2008, the Army reorganized Combat Arms, Combat Support and Combat Service Support into Maneuver, Fires, and Effects (MFE), Operations Support Division (OSD), and Force Sustainment Division (FSD).




Figure 6. SFAS Selection Rate (± 1 Standard Error) for Different active duty Army Populations from 1995-2009.

The success rate at SFAS has averaged 36% over the past 15 years. The profile for active-duty enlisted soldiers who successfully completed SFAS was the following: 71% were Ranger School qualified, 49% were from the Infantry, and 46% were from an airborne unit. In addition to a mean Army Physical Fitness Test (APFT) score of 263, an ASVAB General Technical (GT) score of 115, and five years of prior service in the Army, the successful SFAS candidate was, on average, 26 years old.

E. SFAS AND UW TALENT

SFAS has assessed thousands of potential candidates, both officer and enlisted, since its inception in 1988. While previous chapters detailed the challenge inherent in predicting human behavior in UW operations—and the consequences of not doing so—SFAS *is* effective at measuring the motivation and adaptability of SF recruits. In fact, just considering applying for SFAS tests a soldier's motivation. Many commanders believe that SF lure away their best soldiers, by “skimming off the cream” from the conventional

units, and depleting the larger Army for the good of a small unit.²⁰⁰ The consequence is that a volunteer is already demonstrating a certain degree of courage attempting to join the SF. Many business models, including the attraction-selection-attrition (ASA) model, underscore the fundamental tenet that people self-select into and out of organizations.²⁰¹ While not all Army soldiers walking into a SORB recruiting station say they have always wanted to be a Green Beret, this scene is not uncommon. Individuals tend to associate with others who are similar to them in one or more ways. This similarity helps explain soldiers who follow a professional mentor or peer they view as a competent soldier into SF. The very desire to do a particular job is what business theory deems a “motivational fit.”²⁰² Thus, SFAS can make use of both intended and unintended measures of motivation, from a candidate simply asking a recruiter how to join SF to a candidate actually completing the physically demanding events during SFAS.

SFAS also makes use of assessment activities that test a candidate’s adaptability in ambiguous scenarios. By assessing a recruit’s mental, interpersonal, and physical adaptability, SFAS continually tests whether a recruit can adjust to a continuously changing environment. Motivation and adaptability provide the SF community with

²⁰⁰ For a detailed look at the effects elite units “skimming off the cream” from conventional forces, see Chapter 3, “The Military and Political Costs of Elite Units” of Eliot A. Cohen, *Commandos and Politicians* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Center for International Affairs, 1978), 56–58.

²⁰¹ Sally A. Carless, “Person–job Fit Versus Person–Organization Fit As Predictors of Organizational Attraction and Job Acceptance Intentions: A Longitudinal Study,” *Journal of Occupational and Organizational Psychology* 78 (2005): 412.

²⁰² Kevin C. Klinvex, Christopher P. Klinvex, and Matthew S. O’Connell, *Hiring Great People* (New York: McGraw-Hill Companies Inc., 1998), 119–120. The authors describe “motivational fit” as the level of alignment or agreement between what a person expects or wishes to receive from a job and what the job can actually offer.

easily testable traits during SFAS. Numerous tests have indicated that the primary predictor of success is the APFT score, along with the first ruckmarch, psychological hardiness, and the ASVAB score.²⁰³

None of these different indicators of SFAS success assesses any significant aptitude for cross-cultural work or determines whether an individual has interpersonal intelligence. In fact, it is rare to find either of these cited as a cause for failure at SFAS. While it can be argued that interpersonal intelligence is measured to a certain extent during the teamwork portion of SFAS, rarely are soldiers dropped from SFAS or the SFQC for a lack of teamwork. With respect to a lack of concern about cross-cultural capability, this result is likely due to the belief that language training during a later phase in the SFQC is *the* key to improving cross-cultural skills. This view is widely held even in academia, despite the lack of any empirical evidence to support this conclusion. Results indicate that language training does not produce more positive feelings toward other cultures and ethnic groups. Additionally, language proficiency has little positive effect on adjusting to and building interpersonal relationships in a foreign culture.²⁰⁴ To summarize, SFAS actively measures a recruit's motivation and adaptability; it would be better if more men who possess interpersonal intelligence and an aptitude for cross-cultural work were recruited in. SFAS would still be ideal for assessing their motivation and adaptability for SF. However, front loading the selection process could help produce even more talented UW soldiers.

²⁰³ For analysis of the ASVAB and APFT score, see Michelle Zazanis, Gary A. Hazlett, Robert N. Kilcullen, and Michael G. Sanders, "Prescreening Methods for Special Forces Assessment and Selection," U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences, Technical Report 1094, May 1999; for analysis of APFT score and the first ruckmarch, see Martha L. Teplitzky, "Success in Special Forces Assessment and Selection," U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences, Research Report 1606, November 1991; for analysis of psychological hardiness, which was defined as a "psychological style associated with resilience, good health, and performance under a range of stressful conditions," see Paul T. Bartone, Robert R. Roland, James J. Picano, and Thomas J. Williams, "Psychological Hardiness Predicts Success in U.S. Army Special Forces Candidates," *International Journal of Selection and Assessment* 16, no. 1 (2008): 78–81.

²⁰⁴ Allison Abbe, "Transfer and Generalizability of Foreign Language Learning," U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences Study Report 2008-06, February 2009, 1–10.

V. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION

The following recommendations draw an analysis from the previous chapters, as well as from this author's own experiences as a SF recruiter for 18 months. These conclusions are not prescriptive, but recommend ideas about where to find talented men for SF. The suggestion is not to stop the current recruiting process. In fact, SF have accomplished significant strategic effects in many countries using the active duty Army as its principal recruitment pool. As the U.S. military shrinks and the fitness for military service of America's youth drops, the Special Forces Regiment needs to broaden the source populations from which it recruits to improve the short and long-term health of the regiment. With recruiter reorganization, a referral program, accurate advertising, long-term engagement strategy, and renewed leader involvement, targeted recruitment for interpersonal intelligence and cross-cultural capability could help achieve for SF what NASA achieved during its assessment and selection for the Mercury astronauts:

It was not to separate tigers from bunnies; there just weren't any bunnies ... when the physical, intelligence, and psychological records of each of the thirty-two men were analyzed the doctors found an "embarrassment of riches...we couldn't have made a mistake if we had taken any seven of the thirty-two, the differences were so slight."²⁰⁵

A. TARGETED RECRUITMENT

Traditional recruitment efforts for SF involve face-to-face contact with soldiers at their active duty unit. E-mail contacts are made to all eligible soldiers by a recruiter. Recruiters travel to different military installations to speak with interested candidates on trips that can last days to weeks. Also, the SORB routinely conducts career fairs on larger military installations. In short, the small numbers of SORB recruiters already routinely saturate the markets available within the active duty Army. However, significant markets remain untapped.

²⁰⁵ Martin Caidin, *The Astronauts: The Story of Project Mercury, America's Man-in-Space Program* (New York: Dutton & Co., Inc, 1960), 85–88.

The 18X program could become a windfall for SF. It opens up the entire civilian population under the age of 30. Unfortunately, current NPS recruiters have no incentive to recruit specifically for SF and are unlikely to possess sufficient institutional knowledge about SF. For a more robust 18X program, an OSS-like recruitment effort could be designed to draw a variety of recruits from across all career fields and industries to both attract and identify those with the best traits. SFAS could still measure the motivation and adaptability of each recruit, but the UW “starting material” for these potential operators would be significantly higher. Imagine the UW potential of a first generation American from Africa or South America who is recruited from a previous sales job in which he spent years influencing others to buy things he wanted them to buy. If additional recruiters were added to the SORB to aid in recruitment of civilians for SF, the regiment could target marketing, sales, service industries, or academia in which interpersonal intelligence and cross-cultural capability are vital.

While it may seem that few civilians would be interested in joining SF during a recruiting assignment, this writer discovered that many soldiers were passively considering joining SF. Although some soldiers always knew they wanted to join SF, others did not know until the opportunity presented itself. In fact, recruitment efforts in general often target those not looking for a change. Surveys over three years in the business industry reveal that two thirds of managers who switched jobs did so because a better offer came their way, not because they were looking; many people, in fact, are passive job seekers.²⁰⁶

Over the past 60 years, the threat environment for the United States has shifted from Europe to Asia and Africa. The Soviet threat in Eastern Europe has given way to conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, while major flashpoints remain throughout Africa and Asia. Racial and ethnic minorities are almost universally underrepresented within SF when compared to the potential applicant pool of males within the Army and National Guard overall, which is especially true for blacks. While the Special Forces Regiment was formed using non-citizen refugees in the 1950s, today’s regiment has very few first-

²⁰⁶ Michaels, Handfield-Jones, and Axelrod, *The War for Talent*, 83.

generation Americans (<5%). Of those foreign born, most were born in countries with a U.S. military garrison: Germany, Korea, and Puerto Rico. Notably, the regiment has almost no foreign born men from either Africa or South America.

Recruiting individuals already familiar with a language or another culture would be extremely beneficial. In fact, this process formed the first SF units. Specifically targeting first and second generation Americans, as well as foreign nationals, provides an additional opportunity to find recruits most capable of working with foreign populations.²⁰⁷ SF personnel deployed abroad could potentially serve as recruitment aides, which could attract foreign nationals with the proper credentials. Many foreign nationals speak multiple languages, and bilingualism appears to assist in adapting to different cross-cultural situations.²⁰⁸ The Army recently established the MAVNI program to recruit foreign professionals for service in the Army, and some SF groups have begun to utilize this asset. However, the program needs to be expanded; it is not providing significant numbers of foreign nationals to the SF. Finding multi-lingual recruiters who can break into the first and second generations American market would also prove extremely valuable. Recruitment in locations that contain different ethnic and racial diasporas may help find a diverse group of capable UW warriors.

The other military services offer another potential recruiting pool. If the SF are willing to enlist civilians with no previous military experience, opening up recruitment to members of other services would yield recruits with some previous military experience and, possibly, extensive combat experience in a joint environment. Marines interested in joining SF have contacted recruiters before, but no current policy exists to tap into this potentially large recruitment pool. While such a transfer might be considered stealing personnel by the other services, agreements could be made that the SORB would only reach out to Marines and others at the end of their enlistment. Also, the numbers of servicemen joining SF would likely be small. For example, two U.S. Coast Guardsmen

²⁰⁷ For an entire thesis on this subject, see Trevor O. Robichaux, "Special Forces Recruiting: The Operational Need for Targeted Recruitment of First and Second Generation Americans" (Master's thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, December 2008).

²⁰⁸ Abbe, "Transfer and Generalizability of Foreign Language Learning," 13.

recently became the first non-Navy SEALs to complete SQT.²⁰⁹ As it is, other services might be forced to reduce their manning requirements in certain years as their military budgets are reduced. As these recruits could not return to their previous service once transferred into the Army, they would likely remain highly motivated to complete SFAS. All these factors make opening up SF to the other services worth considering.

B. RECRUITER REORGANIZATION

This thesis was not designed to offer a detailed organizational redesign of the SORB. However, the experiences of this author while in the unit and through conversations with members in the SORB point to some general concerns. First, the SORB should be reorganized under the command of USASOC where it can answer directly to the commander of the units for which it recruits. This move would enable it to respond quickly to emerging requirements, such as the all-female mission to fill the Cultural Support Teams (CST) for USASOC.²¹⁰ Currently, USAREC's Medical Recruiting Brigade commands the SORB; in addition to controlling SF recruiting, this brigade also manages Chaplain recruiting. While USAREC's Medical Recruiting Brigade is a capable recruiting organization for the medical profession, it is not designed to address the unique recruiting needs of SF. Under USAREC, the SORB will always be commanded by an organization that values quantity over quality. One way to resolve this situation in SFs' favor is to assign the SORB to USASOC.

Secondly, the SORB should be manned with additional 18-series NCOs, and it should assume the 18X recruitment mission. How this manning could be accomplished is beyond the scope of this thesis, but the lack of incentive to recruit specifically for SF, as well as the lack of detailed knowledge about SF among current NPS recruiters, hurts recruiting prospects for SF. If the regiment has been able to grow its overall strength by roughly an entire SF group (five battalions) over the past few years, it can surely afford to

²⁰⁹ The two Coast Guardsmen attended SQT as part of an agreement between the Coast Guard, Navy, and SOCOM to integrate a small group of Coast Guardsman each year into SQT; see NSWC Public Affairs, "Joining the Ranks," *Ethos* 9 (2011): 2.

²¹⁰ CSTs are "all-female soldier teams who serve as enablers supporting Army Special Operations combat forces in, and around secured objective areas." For more information on the Cultural Support Teams, see <http://www.soc.mil/CST/CST.html>.

provide additional manpower in its recruitment effort. Most importantly, the SF recruiting job needs to be considered an important position *within* the SF community. Since recruiters in this job routinely interact with Brigade and Corps leadership, these interactions could be used to improve the relationship between the conventional Army and SF.

A candidate who approaches the Non-Prior-Service (NPS) recruiter with interest in the 18X program may find little information or knowledge about SF at the recruiting station. Most of the time, a potential recruit is given a pamphlet, video, or other distributable media with a brief description about SF missions. Since the NPS recruiter is not evaluated on the number of recruits enlisted for a particular specialty, such as SF, the recruiter is much more likely to speak highly about familiar topics. Nor do recruiters have any particular incentive to recruit for the 18X program. Unfortunately, the SF candidate must self-select before visiting the recruiting station.

C. REFERRAL PROGRAM

One of the oldest recruiting methods in business is still the most effective: personal referrals. This technique was employed by the OSS with limited success because no thoughtfully conceived and well-implemented referral program existed.²¹¹ Instead, those in the OSS tended just to hire family and friends. Nearly 40% of over 5,000 business managers surveyed in 1997 were hired from personal contacts. Although recruits referred by employees are often very successful, few organizations take a deliberate or organized approach to tapping into current employee networks. In the competitive environment of today, every SF soldier should be a talent scout.²¹²

A simple tool, like an online system or mailable business card, could help SF soldiers in the field refer potentially competent individuals to recruiters. Critical to a referral program is creating an effective tracking system. Without it, individuals can simply refer friends. In business, poorly run referral systems severely affect

²¹¹ Christopher W. Pritchard, *101 Strategies for Recruiting Success: Where, When, and How to Find the Right People Every Time* (New York: AMACOM Books, 2006), 55–56 and Diane Arthur, *Recruiting, Interviewing, Selecting and Orienting New Employees* (New York: AMACOM Books, 2005), 38.

²¹² Michaels, Handfield-Jones, and Axelrod, *The War for Talent*, 86–88.

organizational morale. Still, informal recruiting yields greater proportions of high-performing and more stable employees than formal recruiting sources.²¹³ SF should strive for quality referrals only.²¹⁴

D. ACCURATE ADVERTISING

Most SF advertising fails to portray accurately the Green Berets' primary mission. The widespread use of "commando" images in SF advertising contradicts the less dramatic but no less important mission of working by, with, and through indigenous forces. While SF soldiers do conduct direct action operations and have to be adept at airborne or SCUBA infiltration techniques, any SF advertising campaign should focus on SF teams working with indigenous personnel, even if considered by some to be less exciting.²¹⁵ Indeed, being more accurate might actually help reduce the number of thrill-seeking men who volunteer for SF only to find they lack cross-cultural capability or simply dislike working with foreigners. Other UW units have similarly experienced truth-in-advertising challenges.

For example, the secrecy that shrouded OSS missions hindered the posting of job descriptions, which created a bias toward men intrigued by secret missions. Covert overseas missions seemed especially attractive to men who were "bored, pathologically adventurous, attracted to danger, or just plain psychopaths."²¹⁶ Navy SEALs, meanwhile, have traditionally been used as maritime commandos and accordingly have focused their recruitment on exceptionally fit men, not men with cross-cultural capability. Yet, SOCOM is increasingly assigning SEALs the UW mission. A quick glance at the NSWRD website, www.sealswcc.com, will not produce images of SEALs working with local forces. Consequently, as SEALs are called on to conduct UW missions, "their skills

²¹³ Robert N. McMurry, "Man Hunt for Top Executives," *Harvard Business Review*, 46–62.

²¹⁴ For earlier analysis on the use of referrals in SF recruitment, see Steven M. Swierkowski and Robert M. Burrell, "Tactics, Methods, and Techniques to Improve Special Forces In-service Enlisted Recruiting" (Master's thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, June 2002).

²¹⁵ The author was guilty of this tactic while serving in the SORB. Rarely did the author choose to use the less exciting images of working with foreign forces for most of the advertising products.

²¹⁶ Donald W. Mackinnon, "How Assessment Centers were started in the United States: the OSS Assessment Program," *Studies in Intelligence* 23, no. 3 (1979): 25.
http://www.ddiworld.com/pdf/ddi_howassessmentcenterswerestarted_mg.pdf.

and training are not directly aligned with such action.”²¹⁷ Learning from these examples, the more truthful the advertising campaign, the more of the right kind of recruits SF should be able to attract. SF should project advertising that depicts Green Berets working with indigenous personnel.

E. LONG-TERM ENGAGEMENT STRATEGY

The Special Forces Regiment should consider developing a long-term recruitment strategy that engages young males at an early age with a goal to increase their awareness about SF. The U.S. Navy SEALs have deliberately planned ways to engage male youth; why should not SF do the same? A long-range engagement strategy would also be the critical component to increasing minority numbers within SF. Most research into why minorities avoid joining SOf indicates a perceived barrier to joining. Recruitment may help to reduce these barriers. Surveyed minorities indicate that many were unaware of SOf before joining the military. By comparison, a large percentage of current SOf members, to include SF, revealed a long-standing desire to join SOf usually developed when very young; many grew up idolizing SOf units. In addition, a number of influencers (parents, grandparents, coaches, and teachers) in minority communities are uninformed about SOf and hesitant to recommend a career in the military, which is compounded by the lack of minority role models within SOf. SF was considered a white organization by several minorities who spoke with this writer when he was a SF recruiter, and this perception reinforced their lack of interest in joining. Thus, any long-term engagement plan must also consider race when attempting to influence youth. Surely, small numbers of properly selected recruiters could help open avenues in traditionally minority populations, thereby increasing the awareness and interest in SF.²¹⁸

²¹⁷ Peterson, *The Strategic Utility of U.S. Navy SEALs*, 68; other SEAL officers in class with the author at NPS from 2010–2011 mentioned the lack of any significant advertising or training in UW when they joined the Navy SEALs.

²¹⁸ Kirby et al., “Why Don't Minorities Join Special Operations Forces?” 523–545.

F. LEADER INVOLVEMENT

Since the operational pace within all of the SF groups is extremely high, little time remains for concerns apart from how to win multiple wars, as well as maintain continuous global engagements. However, any lapse now in quality of personnel joining the regiment will be felt years from now in future conflicts. Thus, a more concerted focus by the leadership within the Special Forces Regiment today is more critical than many may realize. Milton Miles, Eric Feldt, David Sterling, and Charlie Beckwith were all very closely involved in the recruitment process for their organizations. The same has been true of successful businessmen.

When Les Wexner (owner of 3,800 stores, including The Limited, Express, Victoria's Secret, and Bath & Body Works) had falling sales in the early 1990s, he solicited help from other business leaders he respected. His takeaway after speaking with them was that they spent much less time working on new products and advertising. Instead, they spent nearly *half* of their entire effort on personnel, including recruiting new talent. One of the CEOs Wexner spoke to said, "having the most talented people in each of our businesses is the most important thing. If we don't we lose."²¹⁹ Microsoft's Bill Gates and Jack Welch from General Electric spent *fifty percent or more* of their time on recruiting talent in the late 1990s and early 2000s.²²⁰ Arguably, SF should consider what it will take to compete with other organizations for the best people, especially if top leaders from other organizations are willing to spend so much time recruiting. If, for instance, SF soldiers are the best recruiting tool the regiment owns, the time is now to challenge and encourage them to turn every interaction into a subtle "sell" for SF.

G. CONCLUSION

With targeted recruitment, a referral program, reorganization of the SORB under USASOC, accurate advertising, a long-term engagement strategy for recruitment, and renewed leader involvement, SF will be better positioned to recruit individuals who

²¹⁹ Ed Michaels, Helen Handfield-Jones, and Beth Axelrod, *The War for Talent* (Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 2001), 19–20.

²²⁰ Jeffrey E. Christian, *Headhunter's Edge* (New York: Random House, Inc., 2002), 13.

already have the traits common to talented UW operators. No matter their mission, whether advising local partisans in the Humyangbukdo province of North Korea, assisting future Guatemalan government efforts to combat transnational criminal organizations along their Mexican border, or advising local militias in the ongoing war in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, better talent can only help SF. These initiatives would not only draw motivated men able to adapt to changing situations and interact extremely well with populations across varied cultures and organizations while still maintaining the high standards required for completing SF training, but it would also set the conditions retaining them since they would know exactly the kind of work for which they are volunteering before ever entering SF.

As the Army becomes smaller and more homogenous, so does the pool of active duty recruits joining SF. While SFAS will continue to serve the Special Force Regiment well by rigorously assessing the motivation and adaptability of future recruits, adding more SF recruiters to screen additional recruiting pools for those likely to possess interpersonal intelligence and cross-cultural capability will further increase the quality of the regiment of tomorrow. By finding these men, USASOC can provide the National Command Authority yet greater latitude when it comes to considering UW as a primary course of action for contending with future threats.

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APPENDIX A. ACTIVE-DUTY SPECIAL FORCES DEMOGRAPHY

The Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC) in Seaside, CA provided the following data and uses data from January 2011. This appendix compares the demographics of active duty SF (SF) soldiers with non-SF active duty Army male soldiers to determine if statistically significant differences exist. The following conditions were used to calculate statistical significance:

$$\text{Test Statistic (z)} = \frac{\bar{X} - \bar{Y}}{\sqrt{\frac{\sigma_X^2}{m} + \frac{\sigma_Y^2}{n}}}$$

Sensitivity Level (α) = 0.01

$\bar{X} = p_1$ = Special Forces (SF) proportion

$\bar{Y} = p_2$ = Non-Special Forces (non-SF) proportion

$$\sigma^2 = (p) \times (1-p)$$

m = total number of active duty SF soldiers in population = 8,425

When analyzed by individual SF MOS, the following values for m were used:

$$18A = 1,665$$

$$180A = 493$$

$$18B = 1,227$$

$$18C = 1,110$$

$$18D = 1,033$$

$$18E = 1,164$$

$$18F = 482$$

$$18Z = 1,251$$

n = number of Non-Special Forces active duty soldiers in the Army = 479,433

Null hypothesis: *no difference exists between proportion of SF and non-SF*

$$H_0: p_1 = p_2$$

Alternate Hypotheses: *difference exists between proportion of SF and non-SF*

$H_1: p_1 > p_2$ and z value is greater than 2.576 (>2.576):

\therefore SF proportion statistically greater than non-SF proportion

$H_2: p_1 < p_2$ and z value is less than -2.576 (<-2.576)

\therefore SF proportion statistically less than non-SF proportion

Therefore, if the z value falls in the rejection region (>2.576 and $-2.576 >$), one rejects the null hypothesis (that the proportions are not different) and accepts one of the alternate hypotheses, H_1 or H_2 . If the z value for p_1 is greater than 2.576 (>2.576), p_1 is considered statistically significant and greater than p_2 . If the z value for p_1 is less than -2.576 (<-2.576), p_1 is considered statistically significant and smaller than p_2 . If the z value falls outside of the rejection region, (<2.576 and $-2.576 >$), the two proportions are not statistically different.

A. AGE

Table 2 highlights the age breakdown of the active duty SF population when compared to the non-SF active duty Army. Expectedly, the SF proportion of older soldiers is greater than the proportion for non-SF. For example, the proportion of 41–45 years-old 18As ($p=0.189$) is much greater than the proportion of non-SF 41–45 years-old soldiers ($p=0.064$). The 18A proportion is statistically greater because the test statistic, z , has a value of **29.174**, which falls in the rejection region (>2.576 and $-2.576 >$). Similarly, the proportion of 180As between 26–30 years-old ($p=0.008$) produced a z value of **-54.90** when compared to the non-SF proportion of 26–30 year-olds ($p=0.232$), falling in the rejection region (**>2.576** and **$-2.576 >$**).

Table 2. Proportion (p) of active duty SF soldiers by Age Group statistically compared to the proportion of non-SF male soldiers.

z values test for significance (boldface z values indicate statistical significance) at a sensitivity level (α) of 0.01. Of note, 18–20 year-old data was recorded but not displayed because only one SF soldier was in the 18–20 year-old Age-Group.

Age	21-25		26-30		31-35		36-40		41-45		46-50		Over 50	
Non-SF	0.307		0.232		0.146		0.116		0.064		0.024		0.008	
	p	z	p	z	p	z	p	z	p	z	p	z	p	z
SF (Total)	0.093	-66.079	0.288	11.100	0.221	16.553	0.195	18.249	0.142	20.532	0.048	10.325	0.012	3.497
18A	0.064	-88.333	0.221	-2.504	0.205	13.403	0.218	22.606	0.189	29.174	0.077	18.435	0.025	9.988
180A	0.000	-461.388	0.008	-54.900	0.176	1.773	0.337	10.377	0.316	12.058	0.114	6.294	0.049	4.185
18B	0.149	-15.537	0.453	15.515	0.244	7.962	0.110	-0.645	0.036	-5.257	0.007	-7.413	0.001	-8.848
18C	0.181	-10.918	0.434	13.553	0.235	6.995	0.110	-0.626	0.032	-5.892	0.007	-6.444	0.000	-62.625
18D	0.114	-19.483	0.409	11.563	0.235	9.094	0.153	3.315	0.044	-3.186	0.007	-6.578	0.001	-7.320
18E	0.152	-14.738	0.197	13.183	0.262	8.993	0.115	-0.072	0.040	-4.249	0.007	-6.892	0.001	-8.353
18F	0.002	-14.738	0.197	-1.950	0.349	9.329	0.309	9.183	0.110	3.236	0.023	-0.119	0.010	0.489
18Z	0.000	-461.388	0.002	-179.817	0.098	-5.771	0.333	16.262	0.404	24.492	0.140	11.852	0.024	3.667




Figure 7. Comparison by Age Group of active duty SF and non-SF Army males.

B. RANK/GRADE

Table 3 highlights the enlisted rank/grade proportions of active duty SF and non-SF Army male soldiers. The SF proportion of senior ranks (E-6 and E-7) is greater than the proportion for non-SF. For example, the proportion of 18C E-7s ($p=0.473$) is much greater than the proportion of non-SF E-7s ($p=0.116$). 18Cs are statistically much greater because the test statistic, z , has a value of **25.812**, which falls in the rejection region (>2.576 and -2.576). Likewise, the proportion of 18B E-4s ($p=0.013$) produced a z value of **-126.974**, which when compared to the non-SF E-4s ($p=0.434$), it falls in the rejection region (>2.576 and -2.576), indicating the SF proportion is much less than the non-SF proportion.

Table 3. Proportion (p) of active duty enlisted SF soldiers by grade (E-4 to E-7) statistically compared to the proportion of enlisted non-SF male.

z values test for significance (all values significance) at a sensitivity level (α) of 0.01. Of note, 18F had no soldiers below the grade of E-7.

Rank	E-4		E-5		E-6		E-7	
Non-SF	0.434		0.256		0.193		0.116	
	p	z	p	z	p	z	p	z
SF (Total)	0.020	-247.374	0.071	-60.621	0.426	34.861	0.485	74.918
18B	0.013	-126.974	0.077	-23.567	0.426	16.451	0.011	25.818
18C	0.026	-84.331	0.079	-21.764	0.422	15.388	0.473	23.812
18D	0.026	-81.396	0.091	-18.427	0.411	14.232	0.471	22.878
18E	0.023	-91.991	0.093	-19.176	0.416	15.386	0.468	24.072
18F	0.000	-606.769	0.000	-406.480	0.000	-339.017	1.000	1911.768




Figure 8. Comparison by enlisted grade (E-4 to E-7) of active duty SF and non-SF male soldiers.

C. RACE AND ETHNICITY

Table 4 highlights the proportions of different races within the active duty SF when compared to the proportion of non-SF Army male soldiers. Of significance, the proportion of Black SF soldiers ($p=0.046$) and Asian ($p=0.021$) are much smaller than the comparable non-SF proportion for Blacks ($p=0.180$) and Asian ($p=0.037$). The z values for SF soldiers who are Black (-57.136) or Asian (-9.700) are much less than (-2.576), indicating a statistically significant lower number of SF soldiers are Black or Asian than the non-SF population. In contrast, the proportion of white soldiers is significantly higher in SF ($p=0.845$) than the proportion for non-SF ($p=0.722$). This result is statistical significance because the test statistic, z , has a value of 30.621 , which falls in the rejection region (>2.576 and -2.576). All proportions of American Indian or Native Alaskans within SF were not statically significant because their z values fell outside of the rejection region (<2.576 and -2.576).

Table 4. Proportion (p) of active duty SF soldiers by race compared to the proportion of non-SF soldiers.

Comparisons produced z values to test for significance (boldface z values indicate statistical significance) at a sensitivity level (α) of 0.01.

Race	White		Black		Asian		Am. Ind./Na. AK	
Non-SF	0.722		0.180		0.037		0.008	
	p	z	p	z	p	z	p	z
SF (Total)	0.845	30.621	0.046	-57.136	0.021	-9.700	0.008	0.451
18A	0.836	12.518	0.034	-32.409	0.027	-2.391	0.005	-1.661
180A	0.797	4.138	0.061	-11.030	0.006	-8.672	0.010	0.557
18B	0.840	11.270	0.052	-20.027	0.020	-4.002	0.011	1.246
18C	0.890	17.845	0.032	-28.105	0.012	-7.665	0.011	1.025
18D	0.907	20.416	0.019	-37.107	0.020	-3.688	0.010	0.673
18E	0.833	10.159	0.075	-13.591	0.032	-0.925	0.006	-0.711
18F	0.743	1.033	0.073	-9.056	0.027	-1.298	0.008	0.162
18Z	0.837	10.967	0.046	-22.343	0.017	-5.426	0.006	-0.546




Figure 9. Comparison of White active duty SF and non-SF male soldiers.




Figure 10. Comparison of Black active duty SF and non-SF male soldiers.




Figure 11. Comparison of Asian SF and non-SF soldiers.




Figure 12. Comparison of American Indian/Native Alaskan active duty SF and non-SF male soldiers.

Table 5 highlights the proportions of Hispanics within the active duty SF population when compared to non-SF active duty Army male soldiers. Of significance, the proportion of Hispanic 18As ($p=0.041$) and 18Z ($p=0.058$) are much smaller than the comparable non-SF proportion for Hispanics ($p=0.112$). The z value for 18A (-13.813) or 18Z (-8.039) is in the rejection region (>2.576 and -2.576), indicating a statistically significant lower number of 18As and 18Zs are Hispanic than the non-SF population. In contrast, the proportion of Hispanic 18F ($p=0.122$) is slightly larger than non-SF ($p=0.112$), although not statistically significant because the test statistic value is (0.713), which lies outside the rejection region (<2.576 and -2.576). Additionally, the proportion of Hispanic 18B ($p=0.102$) was also not statistically significant, with a z value of (-1.143) inside the rejection region.

Table 5. Proportion (p) of Hispanic active duty SF soldiers statistically compared to the proportion of non-SF soldiers.

z values test for significance (boldface z values indicate statistical significance) at a sensitivity level (α) of 0.01.

Ethnicity	Hispanic	
Non-SF	0.112	
	p	z
SF (Total)	0.072	-13.813
18A	0.041	-14.334
180A	0.073	-3.303
18B	0.102	-1.143
18C	0.077	-4.265
18D	0.064	-6.2796
18E	0.082	-3.750
18F	0.122	0.713
18Z	0.058	-8.039




Figure 13. Comparison of Hispanic active duty SF and non-SF male soldiers.

D. EDUCATION

Table 6 compares the highest level of education achieved by active duty SF with non-SF active duty Army male soldiers. Expectedly, the SF proportion of soldiers with undergraduate degrees ($p=0.224$) is greater than the proportion for non-SF ($p=0.113$). This difference is statistically significant because the z value of (**24.356**) falls in the rejection region (>2.576 and $-2.576<$). The proportion of 18As with Master's degrees ($p=0.354$) is also much greater than the proportion of non-SF ($p=0.116$) and is statistically significant due to a z value of (**25.397**). In contrast, the proportion of SF soldiers with Doctorate degrees ($p=0.001$) is statistically less than the non-SF proportion ($p=0.056$) due to the z value of (**-4.792**), which falls outside of the rejection region (<2.576 and $-2.576<$).

Table 6. Proportion (p) of active duty SF soldiers by highest education level achieved compared to the proportion of non-SF.

z values test for significance (boldface z values indicate statistical significance) at a sensitivity level (α) of 0.01.

Education	No HS Diploma		HS or Equivalent		Some College		BA / BS		Masters		Doctorate	
Non-SF	0.008		0.711		0.097		0.113		0.116		0.056	
	p	z	p	z	p	z	p	z	p	z	p	z
SF (Total)	0.006	-2.627	0.538	-31.613	0.130	9.069	0.224	24.356	0.078	7.498	0.001	-4.792
18A	0.000	-62.803	0.001	-800.073	0.001	-130.610	0.643	45.056	0.354	25.397	0.002	-0.094
180A	0.000	-234.081	0.047	-69.802	0.746	33.147	0.174	3.589	0.032	-2.953	0.000	-30.212
18B	0.014	1.705	0.801	7.878	0.104	0.766	0.066	-6.626	0.002	-45.396	0.000	-30.212
18C	0.009	0.299	0.764	4.132	0.105	0.928	0.098	-1.665	0.003	-33.477	0.001	-1.107
18D	0.006	-0.993	0.678	-2.307	0.106	1.004	0.098	5.319	0.012	-13.259	0.000	-30.212
18E	0.009	0.455	0.736	1.935	0.139	1.161	0.130	1.688	0.005	-23.946	0.000	-30.212
18F	0.009	0.455	0.768	1.935	0.139	2.675	0.052	-6.055	0.000	-168.710	0.002	0.084
18Z	0.002	-5.770	0.602	-7.889	0.146	4.944	0.149	3.535	0.024	-7.390	0.000	-30.212




Figure 14. Comparison of highest level of education achieved of active duty SF and non-SF male soldiers.

E. MARITAL STATUS AND NUMBER OF DEPENDENTS

Table 7 compares the proportions of various marital statuses of active duty SF and non-SF male soldiers. Of significance, the proportion of SF soldiers that are married ($p=0.736$) and never married ($p=0.199$) are much different from the non-SF proportion for married ($p=0.603$) and never married ($p=0.350$). The z for married and never married SF soldiers were (27.376) and (-34.314), which both fall in the rejection region (>2.576 and -2.576). Thus, a statistically significant greater number of SF soldiers are married while a statistically significant lower number of SF soldiers have never been married. Also, the proportion of currently divorced soldiers is greater in SF ($p=0.061$) than the proportion for non-SF ($p=0.045$). This result is also statistical significance because z has a value of (6.105), which falls in the rejection region (>2.576 and -2.576).

Table 7. Proportion (p) of active duty SF soldiers by marital status compared to the proportion of non-SF soldiers.

z values test for significance (boldface z values indicate statistical significance) at a sensitivity level (α) of 0.01.

Marital Status	Annulled		Divorced		Interlocutory		Legally Separated		Married		Never Married		Widowed	
Non-SF	0.0002		0.045		0.00001		0.001		0.603		0.350		0.001	
	p	z	p	z	p	z	p	z	p	z	p	z	p	z
SF (Total)	0.000	0.775	0.061	6.105	0.000	-1.732	0.003	2.638	0.736	27.376	0.199	-34.314	0.001	-0.066
18A	0.001	0.673	0.037	-1.689	0.000	-1.732	0.001	-0.894	0.757	14.616	0.205	-14.648	0.000	-17.123
180A	0.000	-9.696	0.077	2.662	0.000	-1.732	0.004	1.019	0.901	22.076	0.016	-58.235	0.002	0.699
18B	0.000	-9.696	0.074	3.884	0.000	-1.732	0.004	1.614	0.663	4.492	0.256	-7.544	0.001	0.250
18C	0.000	-9.696	0.058	1.795	0.000	-1.732	0.005	1.938	0.668	4.647	0.268	-6.124	0.000	-17.123
18D	0.001	0.798	0.049	0.635	0.000	-1.732	0.005	-0.176	0.680	5.286	0.268	-5.933	0.001	0.369
18E	0.000	-9.696	0.065	2.788	0.000	-1.732	0.006	2.151	0.647	3.150	0.282	-5.168	0.000	-17.123
18F	0.000	-9.696	0.089	2.788	0.000	-1.732	0.000	-23.380	0.817	12.191	0.089	-20.060	0.002	0.706
18Z	0.001	0.755	0.072	3.673	0.000	-1.732	0.000	-23.380	0.871	28.131	0.054	-46.305	0.001	0.235




Figure 15. Comparison of currently married active duty SF and non-SF male soldiers.




Figure 16. Comparison of currently divorced active duty SF and non-SF male soldiers.




Figure 17. Comparison of never married active duty SF and non-SF male soldiers.

Table 8 compares the number of dependents of active duty SF and non-SF male soldiers. Of significance, the proportion of SF soldiers with three dependents ($p=0.238$) and four dependents ($p=0.118$) are greater than the non-SF proportion for three dependents ($p=0.170$) and four dependents ($p=0.093$). These produced z values of (**14.657**) for SF with three dependents and (**7.026**) for SF with four dependents, which both fall in the rejection region (>2.576 and -2.576), indicating statistically significant differences exist between SF and non-SF proportions.

Table 8. Proportion (p) of the number of dependents for active duty SF and non-SF male soldiers.

z values test for significance (boldface z values indicate statistical significance) at a sensitivity level (α) of 0.01.

Dependents	1		2		3		4		5+	
Non-SF	0.191		0.168		0.170		0.093		0.058	
	p	z	p	z	p	z	p	z	p	z
SF (Total)	0.2025	2.576	0.188	4.801	0.238	14.657	0.118	7.026	0.063	1.875
18A	0.198	0.663	0.174	0.677	0.259	8.272	0.126	4.092	0.041	-3.534
180A	0.132	-3.887	0.227	3.142	0.304	6.480	0.201	5.986	0.103	3.311
18B	0.230	3.219	0.187	1.685	0.214	3.786	0.096	0.401	0.046	-2.075
18C	0.241	3.848	0.188	1.738	0.178	0.733	0.090	-0.314	0.049	-1.450
18D	0.252	4.482	0.186	1.486	0.190	1.621	0.090	-0.645	0.056	-0.262
18E	0.216	2.100	0.183	1.333	0.282	1.150	0.083	-1.166	0.061	0.423
18F	0.216	2.100	0.168	1.333	0.282	5.472	0.205	6.118	0.098	2.921
18Z	0.145	-4.661	0.209	3.609	0.337	12.511	0.142	5.007	0.101	5.014




Figure 18. Comparison of the number of dependents of active duty SF and non-SF male soldiers.

F. COUNTRY OF BIRTH

Table 9 highlights the number of foreign-born soldiers in the SF population when compared to the rest of the active duty Army. The proportion of U.S.-born soldiers is slightly higher in SF ($p=0.954$) than the proportion for non-SF ($p=0.948$), but is not statistically significant since test statistic, z , has a value of **2.467**, which falls outside the rejection region (<2.576 and -2.576). Of significance, the proportion of SF born in Africa ($p=0.0004$) and South America ($p=0.0002$) is lower than the comparable non-SF proportion for soldier born in Africa ($p=0.001$) and South America ($p=0.001$). The z values for SF born in Africa **-4.536** and South America **-3.829** is less than **-2.576**, indicating a statistically significant lower number of SF soldiers are foreign born in Africa and South America than the non-SF population. In contrast, the proportion of SF soldiers born in Europe ($p=0.008$) is greater than the proportion of non-SF born in Europe ($p=0.005$) with a z value of **3.537**, indicating a statistically significant larger number of SF soldiers are born in Europe than non-SF.

Table 9. Proportion (p) of active duty SF soldiers born outside of the U.S. by world region statistically compared to the proportion of non-SF soldiers.

z values test for significance (boldface values indicate statistical significance) at a sensitivity level (α) of 0.01. U.S.-born proportions also included for comparison.

Region	Africa		Asia		Australia		Europe		N. America		S. America		U.S.	
Non-SF	0.001		0.008		0.0001		0.005		0.015		0.001		0.948	
	p	z	p	z	p	z	p	z	p	z	p	z	p	z
SF (Total)	0.0004	-4.536	0.006	-2.906	0.000	0.278	0.008	3.537	0.008	-7.047	0.0002	-3.829	0.954	2.467
18A	0.001	-0.138	0.021	3.670	0.001	0.858	0.033	6.446	0.020	1.295	0.001	0.353	0.867	-9.688
180A	0.002	0.350	0.018	1.682	0.000	-6.403	0.026	2.990	0.037	2.500	0.000	-20.794	0.899	-3.625
18B	0.000	-25.156	0.001	-8.843	0.000	-6.403	0.001	-4.847	0.002	-9.109	0.000	-20.794	0.991	15.925
18C	0.000	-25.156	0.000	-62.608	0.000	-6.403	0.000	-48.053	0.005	-5.394	0.000	-20.794	0.990	14.115
18D	0.000	-25.156	0.000	-62.608	0.000	-6.403	0.000	-48.053	0.002	-9.754	0.000	-20.794	0.996	24.631
18E	0.000	-25.156	0.002	-5.235	0.000	-6.403	0.001	-4.551	0.004	-5.762	0.000	-20.794	0.986	11.195
18F	0.000	-25.156	0.002	-2.906	0.000	-6.403	0.000	-48.053	0.006	-2.555	0.000	-20.794	0.992	10.573
18Z	0.000	-25.156	0.000	-62.608	0.000	-6.403	0.000	-48.053	0.001	-17.823	0.000	-20.794	0.941	-1.053




Figure 19. Comparison of foreign-born active duty SF and non-SF male soldiers.

G. U.S. REGIONAL DISTRIBUTION

Table 10 highlights the state residency of the active duty SF population. Expectedly, the SF proportion is high ($p=0.485$) in the Southeast and the test statistic, z , has a value of **41.287**, which lies in the rejection region (>2.576 and -2.576). Thus, SF state residency is statistically much greater in the Southeast when compared to the rest of the active duty Army. In contrast, SF has a z value of **-25.484** for the Midwest, indicating a statistically significant lower number of Midwest residents when compared to the non-SF population.

U.S. states were divided into different regions for this analysis: Northwest=AK, WA, OR, ID, MT, WY; West=HI, CA, NV; Southwest=AZ, UT, CO, NM, TX, OK, AR, LA; Southeast=MS, AL, TN, KY, NC, SC, GA, FL, PR; Midwest=ND, SD, NE, KS, MN, IA, MO, WI, IL, IN, OH, MI; Mid-Atlantic=WV, VA, PA, MD, DE, NJ, DC; Northeast=NY, VT, NH, ME, MA, RI, CT; Other=U.S. provinces outside of fifty states.

Table 10. Proportion (p) of active duty SF soldiers by U.S. region compared to non-SF male soldiers.

z values test for significance (boldface values indicate statistical significance) at a sensitivity level (α) of 0.01. Of note, 0.013 of non-SF reported “unknown” for residency while 0.021 of the total SF population reported residency “unknown.”

Region	Northwest		West		Southwest		Southeast		Midwest		Mid-Atlantic		Northeast		Other	
Non-SF	0.098		0.084		0.203		0.258		0.136		0.091		0.053		0.064	
	p	z	p	z	p	z	p	z	p	z	p	z	p	z	p	z
SF (Total)	0.1339	9.648	0.041	-19.551	0.131	-19.445	0.485	41.287	0.066	-25.484	0.047	-18.471	0.028	-13.149	0.047	-7.251
18A	0.075	-3.519	0.065	-3.060	0.112	-11.788	0.467	17.075	0.065	-11.638	0.095	0.677	0.046	-1.375	0.067	0.449
180A	0.103	0.408	0.022	-9.265	0.144	-3.726	0.544	12.718	0.006	-36.795	0.014	-14.298	0.000	-163.304	0.057	-0.683
18B	0.167	6.495	0.041	-7.654	0.138	-6.620	0.463	14.367	0.080	-7.270	0.038	-9.519	0.034	-3.550	0.036	-5.274
18C	0.154	5.183	0.041	-7.108	0.148	-5.177	0.441	12.225	0.098	-4.253	0.043	-7.741	0.040	-2.226	0.034	-5.427
18D	0.165	5.779	0.046	-5.729	0.136	-6.214	0.441	11.850	0.099	-4.035	0.050	-5.909	0.028	-4.781	0.033	-5.574
18E	0.165	6.163	0.042	-7.042	0.130	-7.340	0.418	11.049	0.090	-5.555	0.039	-9.037	0.032	-4.058	0.038	-4.544
18F	0.168	4.120	0.027	-7.725	0.133	-4.538	0.566	13.648	0.029	-13.985	0.021	-10.740	0.010	-9.148	0.044	-2.187
18Z	0.106	0.970	0.014	-21.368	0.117	-9.484	0.589	23.766	0.010	-45.235	0.022	-16.717	0.004	-26.863	0.058	-0.838




Figure 20. Comparison of U.S. residency of active duty SF and non-SF male soldiers.

APPENDIX B. NATIONAL GUARD SPECIAL FORCES DEMOGRAPHY

Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC) in Seaside, CA provided the following data and uses data from January 2011. This appendix compares the demographics of National Guard (NG) Special Forces (SF) soldiers with the remaining Army National Guard male soldiers to determine if any statistically significant differences exist. The following conditions were used to calculate statistical significance:

$$\text{Test Statistic (z)} = \frac{\bar{X} - \bar{Y}}{\sqrt{\frac{\sigma_X^2}{m} + \frac{\sigma_Y^2}{n}}}$$

Sensitivity Level (α) = 0.01

$\bar{X} = p_1$ = National Guard Special Forces (SF) proportion

$\bar{Y} = p_2$ = Non-Special Forces (non-SF) proportion

$$\sigma^2 = (p) \times (1-p)$$

m = total number of National Guard Special Forces soldiers in population = 1,627

When analyzed by individual SF MOS, the following values for m were used:

18A = 257

180A = 89

18B = 236

18C = 234

18D = 230

18E = 251

18F = 86

$$18Z = 244$$

n = number of Non-SF Army National Guard male soldiers = 313,641

Null hypothesis: *no difference between proportions of SF and non-SF*

$$H_0: p_1 = p_2$$

Alternate Hypotheses: *difference exists between proportions of SF and non-SF*

$H_1: p_1 > p_2$ and z value is greater than 2.576 (>2.576):

\therefore NG SF proportion statistically greater than non-SF NG proportion

$H_2: p_1 < p_2$ and z value is less than -2.576 (<-2.576):

\therefore NG SF population statistically less than non-SF NG population

Therefore, if the z value falls in the rejection region (>2.576 and $-2.576 <$), one rejects the null hypothesis (that the proportions are not different) and accept one of the alternate hypotheses, H_1 or H_2 . If the z value for p_1 is greater than 2.576 (>2.576), p_1 is considered statistically significant and greater than p_2 . If the z value for p_1 is less than -2.576 (<-2.576), p_1 is considered statistically significant and smaller than p_2 . If the z value falls outside of the rejection region, (>2.576 and $-2.576 <$), the two proportions are not statistically different.

A. AGE

Table 11 highlights the age group breakdown between the National Guard SF and non-SF male soldiers. Expectedly, the SF proportion of older soldiers is greater than the proportion for non-SF. For example, the proportion of 46–50 years-olds in SF ($p=0.125$) is much greater than the proportion of non-SF 46–50 year-olds ($p=0.041$). This proportion is statistically greater because the test statistic, z , has a value of **7.710**, which falls in the rejection region (>2.576 and $-2.576 <$). Similarly, the proportion of SF 31–35 year-olds ($p=0.222$) produced a z value of **10.021** when compared to the non-SF proportion of 31–35 year-olds ($p=0.118$), falling in the rejection region (>2.576 and $-2.576 <$).

Table 11. Proportion (p) by Age Group of National Guard SF and non-SF soldiers.

z values test for significance (boldface z values indicate statistical significance) at a sensitivity level (α) of 0.01. Of note, 18–20 year old data was recorded but was not displayed since only one SF soldier was in the 18–20 age group.

Age	21-25		26-30		31-35		36-40		41-45		46-50		Over 50	
Non-SF	0.263		0.187		0.118		0.111		0.095		0.062		0.041	
	p	z	p	z	p	z	p	z	p	z	p	z	p	z
SF (Total)	0.043	-43.190	0.179	-0.759	0.222	10.021	0.184	7.521	0.170	8.088	0.125	7.710	0.076	5.338
18A	0.000	-334.487	0.043	-11.381	0.187	2.808	0.195	22.606	0.189	29.174	0.077	18.435	0.025	9.988
180A	0.000	-334.487	0.022	-10.444	0.101	-0.543	0.258	3.167	0.326	4.651	0.180	2.893	0.112	2.145
18B	0.076	-10.792	0.288	3.439	0.237	4.289	0.140	1.257	0.097	0.139	0.085	1.254	0.072	1.870
18C	0.107	-7.724	0.308	4.009	0.239	4.331	0.158	1.957	0.090	-0.269	0.060	-0.140	0.038	-0.167
18D	0.052	-14.352	0.230	1.574	0.239	7.301	0.243	4.665	0.061	-2.149	0.048	-1.007	0.017	-2.686
18E	0.060	-13.560	0.116	4.001	0.311	6.581	0.135	1.112	0.104	0.458	0.048	-1.053	0.040	-0.058
18F	0.000	-13.560	0.116	-2.037	0.256	2.919	0.198	2.008	0.221	2.820	0.140	2.075	0.070	1.063
18Z	0.000	-334.487	0.000	-268.338	0.049	-5.002	0.201	3.484	0.320	7.532	0.262	7.112	0.168	5.325




Figure 21. Comparison by Age Group of National Guard SF and non-SF male soldiers.

B. RANK/GRADE

Table 12 highlights the difference in rank/grade between National Guard SF and non-SF male soldiers. Expectedly, SF has a greater proportion of more senior ranks (E–6 and E–7) than the proportion for non-SF. For example, the proportion of SF E–7s ($p=0.471$) is much greater than the proportion of non-SF E–7s ($p=0.094$). The greater

number of E-7s in SF display statistically significance because the test statistic, z , has a value of **24.298**, which falls in the rejection region (>2.576 and -2.576). In contrast, the proportion of 18B E-5s ($p=0.077$) produced a z value of **-12.363** when compared to the non-SF E-4s ($p=0.291$), falling in the rejection region (>2.576 and -2.576).

Table 12. Proportion (p) of enlisted National Guard SF soldiers by grade compared to the proportion of enlisted non-SF soldiers.

z values test for significance (all values significance) at a sensitivity level (α) of 0.01. Of note, 18F had no soldiers below the grade of E-7.

Rank	E-4		E-5		E-6		E-7	
Non-SF	0.443		0.291		0.172		0.094	
	p	z	p	z	p	z	p	z
SF (Total)	0.000	-429.707	0.056	-32.674	0.473	19.400	0.471	24.298
18B	0.013	-57.628	0.077	-12.363	0.426	7.873	0.011	12.011
18C	0.026	-39.776	0.079	-11.977	0.422	7.721	0.473	11.619
18D	0.026	-39.428	0.091	-10.539	0.411	7.367	0.471	11.475
18E	0.023	-43.918	0.093	-10.816	0.416	7.825	0.468	11.889
18F	0.000	-429.707	0.000	-308.827	0.000	-219.877	1.000	1498.915




Figure 22. Comparison by enlisted grade (E4–E7) of National Guard SF and non-SF male soldiers.

C. RACE AND ETHNICITY

Table 13 highlights the proportions of different races within the National Guard SF population when compared to the non-SF Army National Guard. Of significance, the proportion of Black SF soldiers ($p=0.028$) is much smaller than the comparable non-SF proportion for Blacks ($p=0.115$). The z values for Black SF soldiers (-21.192) lies far inside the rejection region (>2.576 and -2.576), indicating a statistically significant lower number of SF soldiers are Black than the non-SF population. In contrast, the proportion of white soldiers is significantly higher in SF ($p=0.921$) than the proportion for non-SF ($p=0.823$). This result is statistical significance because the test statistic, z , has a value of 14.631 , which falls in the rejection region (>2.576 and -2.576). All proportions of Asians and American Indians/Native Alaskans within SF were not statically different from the non-SF population because their z values fell outside of the rejection region (<2.576 and -2.576).

Table 13. Proportion (p) of National Guard SF soldiers by race statistically compared to the proportion of non-SF soldiers.

z values test for significance (boldface z values indicate statistical significance) at a sensitivity level (α) of 0.01.

Race	White		Black		Asian		Am. Ind./Na. AK	
Non-SF	0.823		0.115		0.022		0.007	
	p	z	p	z	p	z	p	z
SF (Total)	0.921	14.613	0.028	-21.192	0.018	-0.937	0.004	-2.203
18A	0.836	0.552	0.034	-7.082	0.027	0.539	0.005	-0.512
180A	0.797	-0.613	0.061	-2.123	0.006	-1.878	0.010	0.294
18B	0.840	0.711	0.052	-4.315	0.020	-0.130	0.011	0.636
18C	0.890	3.265	0.032	-7.268	0.012	-1.401	0.011	0.561
18D	0.907	4.373	0.019	-10.468	0.020	-0.134	0.010	0.413
18E	0.833	0.427	0.075	-5.164	0.032	1.984	0.006	-0.441
18F	0.743	-1.709	0.073	-1.502	0.027	0.309	0.008	0.131
18Z	0.837	0.577	0.046	-5.069	0.017	-0.582	0.006	-0.121




Figure 23. Comparison of White National Guard SF and non-SF male soldiers.




Figure 24. Comparison of Black National Guard SF and non-SF male soldiers.




Figure 25. Comparison of Asian National Guard SF and non-SF male soldiers.




Figure 26. Comparison of American Indian / Native Alaskan National Guard SF and non-SF male soldiers.

Table 14 highlights the proportions of Hispanics in the National Guard SF when compared to the non-SF Army National Guard. Of significance, the proportion of Hispanic 18As ($p=0.019$) and 18Ds ($p=0.022$) are much smaller than the comparable non-SF proportion for Hispanics ($p=0.081$). The z value for 18A (-10.691) or 18D (-9.346) fall far inside the rejection region (>2.576 and -2.576), indicating a statistically significant lower number of 18As and 18Ds are Hispanic than the non-SF population. In contrast, the proportion of Hispanic 180A ($p=0.034$) is less than the non-SF population ($p=0.081$) but is not statistically significant because the test statistic value (-2.028) lies outside the rejection region (<2.576 and -2.576).

Table 14. Proportion (p) of Hispanic National Guard SF soldiers compared to the proportion of non-SF soldiers.

z values test for significance (boldface z values indicate statistical significance) at a sensitivity level (α) of 0.01.

Ethnicity	Hispanic	
	Non-SF	0.081
	p	z
SF (Total)	0.030	-27.172
18A	0.019	-10.691
180A	0.034	-2.028
18B	0.025	-8.413
18C	0.026	-8.322
18D	0.022	-9.346
18E	0.040	-5.820
18F	0.023	-5.442
18Z	0.045	-5.015




Figure 27. Comparison of Hispanic National Guard SF and non-SF male soldiers.

D. EDUCATION

Table 15 compares the highest level of education achieved by the National Guard SF population with the non-SF Army National Guard population. Expectedly, the SF proportion of soldiers with undergraduate degrees ($p=0.291$) is greater than the proportion for non-SF ($p=0.122$). This difference is statistically significant because the z value of (**15.004**) falls in the rejection region (>2.576 and -2.576). The proportion of 18As with Master's degrees ($p=0.237$) is also much greater than the proportion of non-SF ($p=0.024$) and is statistically significant due to a z value of (**8.027**). In contrast, the proportion of SF soldiers with Doctorate degrees ($p=0.005$) is less than the non-SF proportion ($p=0.003$), but is not statistically significant because the z value of (**0.993**) lies outside of the rejection region (<2.576 and -2.576).

Table 15. Proportion (p) of National Guard SF soldiers by highest education level achieved compared to the proportion of non-SF soldiers.

z values test for significance (boldface z values indicate statistical significance) at a sensitivity level (α) of 0.01.

Education	No HS Diploma		HS or Equivalent		Some College		BA / BS		Masters		Doctorate	
Non-SF	0.041		0.643		0.165		0.122		0.024		0.003	
	p	z	p	z	p	z	p	z	p	z	p	z
SF (Total)	0.0006	-56.507	0.470	-13.924	0.175	0.993	0.291	15.004	0.058	5.855	0.005	0.993
18A	0.000	-115.274	0.000	-751.434	0.008	-28.509	0.732	22.059	0.237	8.027	0.023	2.140
180A	0.000	-115.274	0.281	-7.597	0.202	0.870	0.382	5.056	0.124	2.846	0.011	0.720
18B	0.000	-115.274	0.648	0.174	0.195	1.153	0.144	0.983	0.013	-1.590	0.000	-31.689
18C	0.000	-115.274	0.658	0.491	0.192	1.052	0.137	0.675	0.009	-2.618	0.000	-31.689
18D	0.004	-8.339	0.561	-2.506	0.204	1.472	0.137	3.522	0.013	-1.506	0.000	-31.689
18E	0.000	-115.274	0.649	0.216	0.279	-0.609	0.187	2.666	0.008	-2.910	0.004	0.199
18F	0.000	-115.274	0.558	0.216	0.279	2.354	0.140	0.480	0.023	-0.065	0.000	-31.689
18Z	0.000	-115.274	0.381	-8.415	0.262	3.447	0.311	6.404	0.045	1.563	0.000	-31.689




Figure 28. Comparison of highest level of education achieved by National Guard SF and non-SF male soldiers.

E. MARITAL STATUS AND NUMBER OF DEPENDENTS

Table 16 compares the proportions of different marital statuses of the National Guard SF population with the non-SF Army National Guard. Of significance, the proportion of SF soldiers that are married ($p=0.668$) and never married ($p=0.250$) are much different from the non-SF proportion for married ($p=0.466$) and never married ($p=0.475$). The z value for married and never married SF soldiers is (17.272) and (-20.979), which both fall inside the rejection region (>2.576 and -2.576). Thus, a statistically significant greater number of SF soldiers are married while a statistically significant lower number of SF soldiers have never been married than the non-SF Army National Guard. Also, the proportion of currently divorced soldiers is greater in SF ($p=0.078$) than the proportion for non-SF ($p=0.057$). This result is also statistical significance because z has a value of (3.167), which also falls inside the rejection region (>2.576 and -2.576).

Table 16. Proportion (p) of National Guard SF soldiers by marital status compared to the proportion of non-SF soldiers.

z values test for significance (boldface z values indicate statistical significance) at a sensitivity level (α) of 0.01.

Marital Status	Annulled		Divorced		Interlocutory		Legally Separated		Married		Never Married		Widowed	
Non-SF	0.0005		0.057		0.00003		0.001		0.466		0.475		0.001	
	p	z	p	z	p	z	p	z	p	z	p	z	p	z
SF (Total)	0.0012	0.882	0.078	3.167	0.000	-2.828	0.001	0.750	0.668	17.272	0.250	-20.979	0.002	1.064
18A	0.000	-12.044	0.109	2.675	0.000	-2.828	0.004	0.853	0.767	11.387	0.121	-17.446	0.000	-14.938
180A	0.000	-12.044	0.034	-1.215	0.000	-2.828	0.011	0.954	0.865	11.026	0.079	-13.897	0.011	0.942
18B	0.000	-12.044	0.059	0.154	0.000	-2.828	0.000	-13.458	0.593	3.981	0.347	-4.126	0.000	-14.938
18C	0.000	-12.044	0.090	1.754	0.000	-2.828	0.000	-13.458	0.543	2.359	0.363	-3.565	0.004	0.835
18D	0.004	0.896	0.057	-0.029	0.000	-2.828	0.000	-13.458	0.652	5.930	0.287	-6.315	0.000	-14.938
18E	0.004	0.886	0.056	-0.081	0.000	-2.828	0.000	-13.458	0.562	3.060	0.378	-3.164	0.000	-14.938
18F	0.004	0.886	0.116	-0.081	0.000	-2.828	0.000	-13.458	0.686	4.399	0.198	-6.466	0.000	-14.938
18Z	0.000	-12.044	0.098	2.171	0.000	-2.828	0.000	-13.458	0.803	13.250	0.094	-20.352	0.004	0.828




Figure 29. Comparison of currently married National Guard SF and non-SF male soldiers.




Figure 30. Comparison of currently divorced National Guard SF and non-SF male soldiers.




Figure 31. Comparison of never married National Guard SF and non-SF male soldiers.

Table 17 compares the number of dependents for the National Guard SF with the non-SF Army National Guard. Of significance, the proportion of SF soldiers with two dependents ($p=0.165$) and three dependents ($p=0.150$) are greater than the non-SF proportion for two dependents ($p=0.122$) and three dependents ($p=0.117$). This produced z values of (4.706) for SF with two dependents and (3.749) for SF with three dependents, which both fall inside the rejection region (>2.576 and -2.576), indicating statistically significant differences exist between SF and non-SF populations.

Table 17. Proportion (p) of National Guard SF soldiers by the number of dependents compared to the proportion of non-SF.

z values test for significance (boldface z values indicate statistical significance) at a sensitivity level (α) of 0.01.

Dependents	1		2		3		4		5+	
Non-SF	0.217		0.122		0.117		0.045		0.020	
	p	z	p	z	p	z	p	z	p	z
SF (Total)	0.3135	8.358	0.165	4.706	0.150	3.749	0.047	0.421	0.028	2.050
18A	0.288	2.506	0.195	2.941	0.206	3.546	0.078	1.993	0.058	2.634
180A	0.247	0.657	0.292	3.531	0.258	3.054	0.067	0.862	0.011	-0.769
18B	0.335	3.828	0.114	-0.362	0.106	-0.538	0.025	-1.861	0.038	1.468
18C	0.312	3.130	0.137	0.661	0.098	-0.946	0.026	-1.824	0.017	-0.323
18D	0.361	4.538	0.139	0.754	0.104	-0.613	0.026	-0.076	0.009	-1.818
18E	0.335	3.945	0.131	0.448	0.151	-1.627	0.028	-1.598	0.004	-3.979
18F	0.335	3.945	0.198	0.448	0.151	0.892	0.035	-0.486	0.035	0.761
18Z	0.283	2.276	0.213	3.478	0.250	4.807	0.074	1.749	0.045	1.900




Figure 32. Comparison of the number of dependents of National Guard SF and non-SF male soldiers.

F. U.S. REGIONAL DISTRIBUTION

Table 18 highlights the state residency of the National Guard SF population. Expectedly, the SF proportion is high ($p=0.296$) in the Southeast and the test statistic, z , has a value of **6.585**, which lies in the rejection region (>2.576 and -2.576). Thus, SF

state residency is statistically much greater in the Southeast when compared to the rest of the Army National Guard. In contrast, the proportion of SF with residency in the Midwest ($p=0.095$) produced a z value of **-22.579** for the Midwest, indicating a statistically significant lower number of Midwest residents are in SF when compared to the non-SF population ($p=0.261$).

The U.S. states were divided into different regions for this analysis: Northwest=AK, WA, OR, ID, MT, WY; West=HI, CA, NV; Southwest=AZ, UT, CO, NM, TX, OK, AR, LA; Southeast=MS, AL, TN, KY, NC, SC, GA, FL, PR; Midwest=ND, SD, NE, KS, MN, IA, MO, WI, IL, IN, OH, MI; Mid-Atlantic=WV, VA, PA, MD, DE, NJ, DC; Northeast=NY, VT, NH, ME, MA, RI, CT; Other=U.S. provinces outside of fifty states.

Table 18. Proportion (p) of SF soldiers by U.S. region statistically compared to the proportion of non-SF soldiers.

Comparisons produced z values to test for significance (boldface values indicate statistical significance) at a sensitivity level (α) of 0.01.

Region	Northwest		West		Southwest		Southeast		Midwest		Mid-Atlantic		Northeast		Other	
Non-SF	0.063		0.065		0.172		0.172		0.261		0.113		0.081		0.025	
	p	z	p	z	p	z	p	z	p	z	p	z	p	z	p	z
SF (Total)	0.0750	1.893	0.063	-0.298	0.232	5.660	0.296	6.585	0.095	-22.579	0.147	3.889	0.092	1.524	0.001	-36.054
18A	0.062	-0.023	0.023	-4.429	0.265	3.350	0.288	2.370	0.054	-14.535	0.195	3.314	0.016	-8.414	0.004	-5.405
180A	0.056	-0.263	0.056	-0.366	0.202	0.701	0.258	0.807	0.146	-3.058	0.146	0.891	0.135	1.496	0.000	-89.560
18B	0.089	1.423	0.068	0.164	0.258	3.020	0.271	1.734	0.085	-9.689	0.140	1.202	0.089	0.449	0.000	-89.560
18C	0.115	2.527	0.073	0.444	0.184	0.449	0.308	2.873	0.120	-6.636	0.124	0.521	0.077	-0.214	0.000	-89.560
18D	0.087	1.311	0.061	-0.269	0.278	3.582	0.313	3.010	0.074	-10.808	0.109	-0.195	0.078	-0.135	0.000	-89.560
18E	0.056	-0.471	0.112	2.337	0.239	2.475	0.255	1.235	0.120	-6.883	0.147	1.551	0.072	-0.549	0.000	-89.560
18F	0.070	0.261	0.058	-0.276	0.186	0.326	0.302	1.642	0.081	-6.074	0.163	1.258	0.140	1.576	0.000	-89.560
18Z	0.053	-0.648	0.049	-1.150	0.193	0.801	0.352	4.298	0.107	-7.790	0.156	1.854	0.090	0.518	0.000	-89.560




Figure 33. Comparison of U.S. residency of National Guard SF and non-SF male soldiers.

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